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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE 
This thesis studies a central issue in security affairs in the context of an equally 
important issue in military affairs.  It is an examination of the ongoing transformation of 
the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) using the U.S. military transformation as a comparative 
model.  The two main research areas of the thesis are the U.S. military transformation and 
the IDF’s transformation.  On the other hand, these two transformations do not receive 
the same level of interest.  There is an ongoing debate on the expediency of the U.S. 
military transformation and on its qualification as a Revolution in Military Affairs. 
However, the IDF’s current transformation, in U.S. terms, is not subject to much interest 
and debate in academic circles1. 
Considering the rise of alternative forms of warfare that strengthens the 
conventionally weak but organizationally innovative opponents, the global trends that 
challenge the modern way of conducting business and the explosion of information 
technologies in every realm of life, one could argue that, war fighting is now in a post-
modern phase.  However, militaries worldwide are designed to operate in a classical 
fashion that is a product of the modern times.  Therefore, the transformational efforts are 
extremely important in determining the relevance of these militaries in future warfare.  
Since Israel is at the center of military activity in the Middle East, the IDF’s receptivity to 
these new terms of warfare will continue to be of interest.  The future posture of the IDF 
will be a determining factor for the development of security issues in the Middle East. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the transformation of the IDF and by doing 
so to picture the IDF’s profile in the near future and provide to the studies that discuss the 
IDF. The thesis also examines the chief military transformation project: the U.S. military 
 
1 The literature on the IDF’s current transformation is not rich. However, there are two studies from 
the 1990’s, a time when the U.S. military transformation’s initial revelations received attention of militaries 
worldwide, including the IDF. In “Tanks, Knives and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution” (Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, 1998) Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt and Andrew J. Bacevich study 
the factors leading to change in the IDF and recommend a transformational blueprint making use of the 
American military’s posture.  Also, in Numbers or Networks: Social Constructions of Technology and 
Organizational Dilemmas in IDF Modernization , Chris A Demchak, examines the IDF’s organization in 
the face of the emerging technologies and new  information capabilities.   
2 
transformation.  The study of the U.S. transformation will uncover the degree to which 
the U.S. model can be applied to other militaries and will search for the solutions that 
other militaries can offer to the current problems of the U.S. military transformation. 
B. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
Since the thesis will explore the IDF transformation in terms of U.S. 
transformation, it first develops the U.S. transformation model.  The analysis of this 
model provides criteria for the rest of the study, which involves finding connections with 
the IDF’s conditions and its transformation efforts.  The salient questions regarding the 
U.S. model are: What are the factors that mandate a transformation in the U.S. military?  
What are the strategic threats for the U.S.?  What kind of a force structure does the U.S. 
transformation envision?  What are the shortcomings of the U.S. transformation?  Is it a 
unique project or can other militaries adapt it? 
In response to these questions, the thesis partly benefits form the official U.S. 
rhetoric which argues that the U.S. transformation is a unique project that is mandated by 
strategic interests, technological imperatives, and threats against the U.S.  The thesis 
further argues that the U.S. model is a unique project that serves global U.S. goals, is 
designed by an ambitious cadre, and is supported by immense resources.  Being a 
progressive project, with an emphasis on information warfare and high technology 
conventional weapons, the U.S. transformation inadequately addresses today’s battles, 
which are often fought by unconventional means.  Moreover, the thesis contends that the 
U.S. military transformation is not completely applicable to other militaries because of its 
uniqueness and also due to the aforementioned deficiencies, i.e., non-conventional 
threats. 
An analysis of the IDF’s transformation reveals the motivation behind such 
changes in the IDF.  Are there real imperatives that force an organizational change on the 
IDF or not? If there are real imperatives, how do they affect the IDF?  The answers to 
these questions are important in determining the key areas that needs to be addressed by 
the transformation projects.  These answers also help in evaluating the success of the 
IDF’s current transformation.  In answer to these questions, the thesis argues that IDF 
faces a number of transformational imperatives: 
3 
First of all the development of the high technology weaponry and the information 
technologies compel militaries for the procurement of these and more importantly suit 
their organizations to operate with these new technologies.  Being one of the most active 
militaries IDF can neither isolate itself from these developments nor can refrain from 
exploiting its advantages in this field.  Secondly, the Israeli society is undergoing a 
societal transformation.  Fifty-six years after the State’s foundation, the Israeli population 
is no longer a coherent society that is united around the nation-in-arms notion.  The 
recently emerged social groups in the society have changed the perception of military 
service in Israel.  Thirdly, religious groups in the IDF pose a potential threat for the 
operation of the military in religiously-sensitive future operations.  Finally, the recent 
performance of the IDF against asymmetric opponents has eroded its image, both in the 
eyes of the Israelis, and the IDF’s opponents. 
The third set of questions concerns the Israeli security environment that defines 
the IDF’s specific mission.  The mission of the IDF is to protect the state of Israel against 
threats.  While this mission stays the same, the threat environment is dynamic in nature 
and consists of a variety of threats.  The IDF should be responsive to the threats and as 
they keep changing, the transformation of the IDF should address the relevant threats and 
responsiveness of the IDF.  The question is: What are the threats in the Israeli security 
environment?  Which one has the primacy?  Is there a connection between the three 
different types of threats? 
The thesis identifies three main types of security threats against the IDF.  The first 
one is the conventional military threat, which depends on the capabilities of the IDF’s 
immediate opponents, the militaries of the countries bordering Israel..  The second threat 
is the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that extends the threat environment 
beyond the Levant to the Iranian Gulf and North Africa.  The third one is the asymmetric 
threat that is staged by the anti-Israel organizations in and out of Israel.  The thesis argues 
the asymmetric threat is currently the most urgent threat for the IDF.  However, the 
transformation of the IDF must address a broad spectrum of threats because of the notion 
of interconnectivity among the threats in the security environment. 
4 
The final set of questions concern the IDF’s continuing transformation project.  
These questions are; Is there an ongoing IDF transformation?  If so, what is the IDF’s 
experience in this?  Can the U.S. transformation be adapted by the IDF to any degree?  
Did the U.S. military transformation model ever affect the IDF?  If so, how can we 
interpret the IDF’s transformational actions in U.S. terms?  Could the IDF learn much 
from the U.S. military transformation?  What other U.S. concepts or projects can the IDF 
utilize? 
The thesis contends that the IDF has a considerable level of adaptability of the 
U.S. concepts and acknowledges that the success of the IDF in applying some aspects of 
the U.S. military transformation.  The IDF’s transformation projects in the last decade are 
reminiscent of the original American concepts.  The thesis also asserts that the IDF can 
benefit more from the U.S. model—or U.S. military’s organization as a whole— to 
consolidate its transformation. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
1. Methodology 
The thesis recognizes that the IDF transformation has been in progress for more 
than a decade, thus the IDF transformation is studied in a broad context by reviewing the 
past and current projects.  The thesis identifies the fundamentals of the past 
transformation projects, analyzes key developments in the current projects, and 
recommends solutions based on the U.S. military transformation.   
The two principal areas examined in this thesis are the U.S. military 
transformation and the IDF, and much of the analysis considers the interactions between 
the two.  The U.S. military transformation is considered the most appropriate 
comparative model to be applied to the IDF.  This is due, in part, to recognition that the 
current U.S. military is the world’s most capable military and that the U.S. military 
transformation is both a determined and futuristic project.  However, this thesis also 
examines the U.S. transformation with a critical eye and does not neglect the 
inconsistencies in the U.S. military transformation. 
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The IDF is the second area of interest in the thesis.  A substantial understanding 
of the IDF is a necessary condition for identification of the problematic issues concerning 
the IDF.  Therefore, the thesis studies the IDF from a number of different perspectives.  
Some of these areas include: organization, threat environment, social environment, 
strategy, modus operandi, weapons proliferation, and transformational planning.  The 
analysis of these areas provides the needed background for a true assessment of the IDF’s 
current transformation programs. 
2. Sources 
The study utilizes both primary and secondary sources.  The U.S. and Israeli 
government publications, official websites of the national defense and international 
institutions, interviews and the U.S. military transformation documents constitute the 
primary sources.  As for the secondary sources, the thesis uses websites of American, 
Israeli, and international think-tanks, commercial websites, electronic journals, defense 
related databases, published journals, articles and books on Israeli security affairs.  The 
author of this thesis fully acknowledges that a substantial amount of information on the 
topic of IDF transformation is of a classified nature, but aims to reach conclusions based 
on making use of the available open source data on the U.S. military transformation and 
the organization, procurement and transformational projects of the IDF. 
3. Roadmap 
Chapter II explores the U.S. military transformation as revealed by U.S. defense 
authorities.  The conditions, operational goals, and imperatives that led to the current 
military transformation are studied, as are the main concepts that are representative of 
this transformation.  The chapter also asserts that the U.S. military transformation cannot 
be directly applied to other militaries but can serve as a good model that might be of 
benefit to other military transformation projects.  The chapter concludes with a review of 
the criticisms of the U.S. transformation effort. 
Chapter III makes an assessment of the Israeli security environment in order to 
define imminent threats and to determine key IDF capabilities required to counter these 
threats.  The three main types of military threats in the Israeli security environment are 
discussed: conventional, WMD, and sub-national threats. 
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Chapter III contends that the most important one among the trio is the sub-national threat.  
However, it further asserts that there is interconnectivity among these three types of 
threats thus making a quick escalation of conflict possible. 
Chapter IV examines the domestic conditions that mandated the transformation of 
the IDF and identifies the conditions that have formed the current posture of the IDF.  
This includes exploration of societal changes in Israel, the IDF’s recent performance 
against asymmetric opponents, religious activism, and the state of the civil-military 
relations in Israel.  The chapter argues that in addition to the military threats, these 
domestic factors also mandate changes in the IDF.  Finally, the chapter considers the 
applicability of the U.S. military transformation model to the IDF, and concludes with the 
assertion that the IDF’s transformation could benefit from the lessons learned from the 
U.S. experience. 
Chapter V examines the IDF’s transformation, in the context of the U.S. military 
transformation.  The chapter acknowledges that the IDF model has benefited from the 
U.S. concepts and shows that it has developed capabilities that even transcend the current 
U.S. implementation.  The chapter concludes with proposed amendments to the IDF’s 
structure and recommendations for the IDF’s transformation, based on findings gained 
from analysis of the U.S. model. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary of findings and 














II. THE MODEL:  THE U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The study of the IDF’s transformation requires a solid understanding of the 
American military transformation.  An examination of U.S. military transformation can 
provide examples relevant to Israeli transformation projects.  Since the U.S. military 
transformation is designed for the U.S. military, and since it is an ongoing project that 
might prove inadequate for the demands of new wars, the U.S. military transformation 
should be carefully scrutinized for relevance to the IDF.  Analysis of U.S. military 
transformation will bring out concepts that might be useful to IDF ground forces, but 
other concepts might contribute little to the development of the IDF, other than serving as 
mental exercises for the study of global military affairs. 
This chapter examines the U.S. military transformation as a model that is being 
adopted in light of recent technological developments, new strategic realities, and 
ultimately, political decisions made in response to external factors.  The chapter argues 
that the U.S. military has unique characteristics, and points out that the transformation is 
far from completion.  It further contends that, while it is not possible to make a direct 
application of the U.S. transformation to other militaries, others can benefit from the 
valuable lessons learned from the U.S. military transformation.  Therefore, in the study of 
IDF transformation the U.S. model should not be considered a concrete model, but, 
instead, its relevant elements should be incorporated into the Israeli transformation 
projects. 
As an attempt at understanding the U.S. military transformation, as devised by 
American defense authorities, the chapter first introduces the goals of U.S. defense 
organizations and the imperatives that dictate changes in the defense establishment.  
Secondly, the chapter reviews the pillars and the main concepts of the military 
transformation.  Thirdly, the chapter argues that U.S. military transformation is unique, 
making a direct application impossible for other countries.  Finally the chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the current U.S. military transformation. 
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B. WHAT IS THE U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION? 
The U.S. military transformation is a process that aims to shape the conduct and 
nature of warfare, preferably in the near future, but definitely in the first quarter of the 
21st century.  The U.S. strategic planners have devised a process that will involve current 
and future concepts and capabilities.  This process aims to unify the efforts of people and 
organizations in building a military that will be able to dictate the U.S. terms of warfare 
to any adversary in the world.  DoD Transformation Planning Guidance defines the 
military transformation as: 
…a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and 
cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people 
and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against 
our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which 
helps underpin peace and stability in the world.2
The U.S. military transformation is designed to exploit the current asymmetrical 
advantages of the U.S. and to widen the gap between the U.S. and its competitors.  The 
U.S. military has been increasing its level of control over the global theater since WWII.  
Moreover, the post- Cold War era has made the U.S. military the only force capable of 
controlling the global commons of warfare; i.e., the ability to dominate air, land, sea, and 
space globally.  Widespread application of information technologies, global power 
projection, and strategic deployment capabilities are the main areas in which the U.S. 
military has no peers.  The aim of the U.S. transformation is to employ a dynamic model 
that can continue and further enhance U.S. supremacy in military affairs. 
The transformation process will enable the military to serve best in securing the 
“enduring national interests” of the U.S.  These permanent interests are the guiding tenets 
for U.S. security organizations, and, as one of the principle promoters of U.S. interests, 
the DoD has the responsibility of forming, maintaining, and training the U.S. military.  A 
true analysis of the U.S. military transformation is only possible when one understands 
U.S. national interests and the ways in which these interests are manifested in the 
documents of the related defense organizations.  Only in this context can one really 
understand the ends guiding the U.S. military transformation. 
 
2 DoD Transformation Planning Guidance, 
<http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_129_ Transformation_Planning_Guidance 
_April_2003_1.pdf> (June 18, 2004) 
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C. THE OPERATIONAL GOALS OF THE DOD 
Even though the first three paragraphs of the Quadrennial Defense Review Report 
(QDR), dated September 30, 2001, deal with the terrorist attacks on the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, the report stresses that the leaders of the DoD were determined to 
establish a new strategy for America’s defense even before the incidents of September 
11th.3  According to the architects of this military transformation, the new strategy and the 
transformational efforts that enabled it were not reactionary but were well-planned out 
projects of the DoD. 
In the QDR, the DoD has declared six operational goals, serving the U.S. grand 
strategy and providing guidance for the DoD’s military transformation: 
1. Operational Goal 1 
Protecting critical bases of operation and defeating chemical, 
radiological, biological, nuclear, explosive (CRBNE) weapons and 
their means of delivery. 
The QDR 2001 states that protection of the American homeland is the foremost 
mission for the U.S. Armed Forces and for its reserve components.  Protection of the 
homeland against conventional and CRBNE attacks is possible by employing both 
conventional and non-conventional U.S. capabilities.  Although the report mentions use 
of layered missile defenses together with forward-deployed forces and U.S. allies as the 
primary tools for the protection of the homeland, it does not articulate the importance of 
conventional forces, which are the core of the military transformation in the defense of 
these elements.4
2. Operational Goal 2 
Assure information systems in the face of attack and conduct effective 
information operations. 
Advances in information technologies and their applications to the military, have 
made information operations a core competency of the U.S. military.  Information 
operations are those actions taken to affect enemy information and information systems 
while defending one's own information and information systems.  The DoD aims to 
further develop capabilities to conduct information operations.  The development of new 
 
3 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2001, Foreword. 
4 QDR, 42. 
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technologies and their successful applications are needed to continue U.S. supremacy.  
Since the U.S. military transformation depends so heavily on information technologies, 
this goal is the DoD baseline for the transformation process. 
3. Operational Goal 3 
Project and sustain U.S. forces in distant anti-access area denial 
environments. 
An anti-access area is the operational territory that is either controlled or affected 
by unfriendly states or groups opposing the U.S.  The U.S. military’s global posture 
entails forward-positioned, forward-deployed, and expeditionary forces.  The Cold War 
legacy force of the U.S. is concentrated in Western Europe and Northeast Asia5.  
However, according to new U.S. strategic thinking, a unipolar world, and increasing 
threats against the U.S. call for well-armed, deployable, and logistically sustainable 
forces that can fight in distant theaters, despite the adversary’s anti-access capabilities.  
The QDR states that the current U.S. force is not sufficient for such a posture.  The 
transformation of the U.S. military involves developing this operational concepts and 
managing the procurement requirements to build the military for such a global posture. 
4. Operational Goal 4 
Deny the enemy sanctuary by providing persistent surveillance, 
tracking, and rapid engagement. 
This operational goal will be ensured by the utilization of new intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technologies that will prevent the enemy from 
taking advantage of vast, rough terrain, civilian shields, and hidden bunkers.  Therefore, 
the new information capabilities will almost nullify the traditional advantage of “strategic 
depth”.  However, there is a current debate on the degree to which ISR technologies can 
deny enemy sanctuary.  ISR technologies will always have limitations stemming from the 
nature of the target, as it may be an urban terrain or thick wooded terrain.  In some cases 
ISR will simply not be enough to assess the quality and value of the targets, since these 
targets may be mixed with friendly forces.  One can surmise that there are serious 
challenges with this operational goal, since the U.S. is currently unable to effectively 
identify, track or target hidden enemies using ISR technologies alone. 
 
5 QDR, 25. 
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5. Operational Goal 5 
Enhance the capability and survivability of space systems. 
Space systems are key capabilities for operational effectiveness, intelligence, and 
economic stability.  Information operations will continue in this new theater of war.  The 
U.S. space systems will be upgraded and protected against the enemy, while attacking the 
enemy’s space capabilities. 
6. Operational Goal 6 
Leverage information technology and innovative concepts to develop 
interoperable joint command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. 
The U.S. military needs high-capacity and reliable C4ISR systems.  Moreover, 
this C4ISR capability should be joint, which means the information should be shared 
within the military and between other agencies.  Any future military that has joint C4ISR 
capabilities must be interoperable.  To develop an interoperable military, the 
transformation philosophy should promote the two essentials: innovation and leverage of 
information technologies.  However, innovation and information technologies will 
enhance military transformation only if they are consolidated with joint training that aims 
at developing joint standard operations procedures and employs new technologies in 
these joint forces. 
D. THE U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY DOCUMENT 
The National Military Strategy Document of the Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) elaborates the military dimension of the national defense strategy as they relate to 
the operational goals of the DoD.  Included in the 2004 version of this document are the 
three national military objectives for the U.S. military, which are essential in 
understanding the military dimensions of the six aforementioned operational goals stated 
in QDR 2001. 
The National Military Strategy Document gives priority to the protection of the 
U.S. homeland by defending through layers.  This multi-layered protection of the U.S. 
works in a proactive manner with a preventive strategy.  This approach considers 
terrorism to be the primary enemy and intends to fight the terrorist organizations in their 
sanctuaries, before thy can stage operations in the U.S. homeland.  The deployment of the 
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U.S. military in Afghanistan, immediately after the events of September 11th, is an 
outcome of this approach, which tasks the U.S. military in distant theaters with limited 
time for operational planning.  This preventive approach also employs the concepts of 
protection of strategic routes, decisive action in the homeland, and the creation of an anti-
terrorism environment. 
The second objective of U.S. national military strategy is the prevention of 
conflict and surprise attacks.  Parallel with the protection of the homeland, this concept 
entails the forward presence of the U.S. military at overseas bases.  According to the 
document, the forward presence will assure the U.S. ability to meet its commitments and 
to react rapidly to regional contingencies.  Positioning in critical regions will enable the 
U.S. to avoid surprise attacks since the military will have the flexible deterrence options 
(FDO) to counter and punish such attacks.  However, one can state that forward 
positioning generates resistance among the population of the host countries and, in turn, 
provides an excuse for the establishment of anti-U.S. organizations, as well as enabling 
them to recruit supporters among the hostile population. 
Finally, the U.S. national military strategy involves prevailing against adversaries 
when the deterrence fails.  This element of the strategy stresses the importance of a robust 
conventional force that will secure a smooth victory over adversaries along a wide 
spectrum of threats.  Moreover, defeating the enemy decisively is not an end state itself.  
The military will have to carry out stability operations in the absence of any effective 
structure, or even a unifying authority, left in the defeated country of the adversary. 
The recent Operation Iraqi Freedom is the ultimate implementation of this 
concept, in which forward-deployed U.S. military forces defeated the Iraqi military 
decisively and continued the mission by conducting stability operations.  However, it is 
not certain that the conventional U.S. military will be as successful in this post-conflict 
mission as it was in the phase of major combat operations.  This new task necessitates 
different force structures, urban doctrine, and conflict type technologies.  It is also 
questionable that the military envisioned by the military transformation is relevant to the 
developing reality of contemporary warfare, i.e., insurgent warfare. 
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Today in the U.S., there is no agreement on the military structure best-suited to 
carry out stability operations in post conflict environments.  The military that is trained to 
fight and win wars operates in a conventional fashion, and, in rare cases, operates 
unconventionally with special units.  On the other hand, the post conflict operations are 
carried out in a constabulary fashion and they require a civilian effort that will rebuild the 
country’s infrastructure.  Although a secure environment is a precondition for all non-
military activities, it is yet unclear what kind of a security provider is best for these 
situations.  Therefore, the task of pacifying and rebuilding a ruined country challenges 
even “information age” militaries like the U.S. military and delays its transformational 
programs that continue operating within a conventional paradigm. 
E. TRANSFORMATION IMPERATIVES 
The military transformation is not necessarily a process that aims at improving the 
U.S. superiority in military affairs.  According to U.S. leaders, the military transformation 
is indeed an obligation for the continuation of U.S. military superiority.  Throughout 
history every military power has had to operate under changing circumstances, some 
adapted new models and survived, others resisted the change and ultimately relinquished 
their position to the smaller powers that understood the importance of adapting to these 
changing circumstances.  Today, the U.S. is the prominent military power, but it also 
faces the phenomenon of change, with its implications for military strategy, organization, 
and technology.  The Military Transformation document of the Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT) examines the need for military transformation in terms of four 
imperatives: strategic, technology, threat, and risk mitigation.6
The strategic imperative is caused by the need to maintain a wide gap between the 
U.S. and its competitors.  According to the OFT document, while the U.S. enjoys 
hegemony in modern warfare, competitors are determined to catch up, utilizing new 
information technologies, modeling U.S. structures, and procuring and developing arms 
with similar capabilities. 
 
6 The Office of Force Transformation (OFT) monitors and evaluates the implementation of the DoD’s 
transformation strategy.  The director of the OFT advises the Secretary of Defense and manages the 
transformation roadmap process. 
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On the other hand, the U.S. is motivated to further widen this gap, so that the U.S. can 
enjoy even greater superiority over its competitors.  The result is that, neither the U.S., 
nor its competitors are indifferent to the development of the other side.  
Developments in science and technology, particularly in information 
technologies, have enabled the U.S. to consolidate its position by promoting new 
technologies, such as, precision munitions, information processing, and advanced 
communications, while making it less dependant on the classical tools of war.  However, 
there is no monopoly in the technology realm.  Any country can utilize the current 
technologies that have impacted warfare with conscious investment in that field.  A 
historical example is the German Blitzkrieg at the onset of WWII.  The Blitzkrieg became 
possible with the technologies that created the heavy tank brigades, radio communication, 
and airpower.  Although almost all of the Western powers had these technologies at the 
time, only Germany was able to make a revolutionary application of them in warfare.  By 
the same token, even today, the possession of technological and scientific assets can only 
be meaningful with a continuous effort to develop new ways of employing them. 
As for the threat environment, the end of the Cold War brought a new world order 
and new potential threats to the U.S.  China, as a rising power, can threaten U.S. interests 
in South Asia and, to a degree, on the global scale.  A technologically and economically 
advanced China would threaten the U.S. militarily.  The procurement of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and investment in these technologies is easier now.  States like 
North Korea and Iran will try to possess these weapons to deter the U.S.  The 
ungovernable regions and failed states are other sources of instability.  For the developers 
of the U.S. military, these are all reasons for changing the current military so that it can 
be effective against this broad spectrum of threats. 
Another kind of threat is the aggression staged by militarily inferior organizations, 
in most cases non-military threats.  Terrorist groups and other anti-U.S. organizations 
have sanctuary in certain parts of the world and have global-reach capabilities.  These 
organizations fight the U.S. employing asymmetrical strategies.  These asymmetrical 
strategies may employ tactics ranging from suicide bombers to nuclear attacks.  While 
being an impediment to the development of a military’s conventional posture, 
asymmetric warfare is a reality that must be addressed by the U.S. military 
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transformation.  On the other hand, asymmetric warfare should compel the U.S. military 
to pursue an ambitious transformation project, since the best response to this threat would 
be the development of new approaches, using the material and resources currently at 
hand. 
The final imperative, risk mitigation, aims to balance DoD attention and resources 
concerning near term operational challenges with those concerning future challenges.  
This is the “transformer’s dilemma”.  On the one hand, there is a need to respond to 
current operational risks, which compel defense leaders to invest in current capabilities, 
but on the other hand, this is at the expense of projects and experiments that will shape 
the future force.  In other words, the future of military transformation is threatened by 
current missions that block the plans, funds, and interest that should be invested in 
military transformation.  However, the presence of these formidable challenges and the 
need to counter them may provide an opportunity to develop a solid transformation that 
will address the real threats rather than potential threats. 
F. FOUR PILLARS OF MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
The analysis of the DoD’s operational goals, JCS’s national military objectives, 
and the compelling imperatives are helpful in understanding the rationale of the ongoing 
military transformation.  The next phase is to identify the fundamentals of the U.S. 
military transformation.  The OFT has identified these fundamentals as the “pillars” of 
the military transformation, which are based on the above mentioned goals, objectives 
and imperatives, and are aimed at providing a framework for the military transformation.  
U.S. transformation strategists think that the four pillars of the military transformation 
will turn today’s industrial force into an information age force.7
1. Pillar One: Strengthening Joint Operations 
The transformed military will have services that operate in a joint fashion.  The 
jointness of the military will be based on a continuous process of development of 
procedures and concepts.  The Joint Operating Concepts and the overarching Joint 
Operations Concept will develop in three time frames (near-term, mid-term, long-term) 
and will enable the military to create the future force, while operating in today’s high risk 
environment.  Accordingly, the U.S. military is undergoing structural changes, such as 
 
7 The four transformation pillars are explained in the Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach 
document of the OFT. 
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the re-organization of areas of responsibly (AOR) and changes in the tasks of the 
combatant commands that aim at forming the joint force positioned in different forward 
bases for specific missions.8
Joint Vision 2020 (JV2020) is the future projection of the military transformation 
and is considered to be a long-term objective.  JV2020 identifies two enablers for the 
military transformation: information technologies and innovation.  The procurement and 
development of information technologies will continue information superiority, which is 
the first objective in warfare.  Information gathered by superior tools will be converted to 
knowledge and, finally, to “decision superiority”.  Decision superiority allows the joint 
force to make better and faster decisions than the adversary, leading to a control of the 
tempo of the battle and mastery of the adversary. 
The second enabler in the transformation process, innovation, is the expression of 
the mindset that will avoid building the Maginot Line of the military transformation.  To 
ensure a development that is free of biases, the military transformation requires 
continuous learning and encouragement of critical thinking.  Therefore, the joint force 
will tolerate mistakes by individuals, encourage their self-confidence, and promote 
innovation just as the German military did before the Blitzkrieg. 
The focus of JV2020 is “full spectrum dominance”.  This concept implies that the 
joint force is able to conduct operations as a combination of forces that have been 
prepared for specific missions, while dominating all dimensions of war: land, sea, air, 
space, and information.  The joint force will have combat and non-combat missions, 
ranging from large-scale combat operations, to the support of U.S. civilians.  The success 
of the full spectrum dominance is evaluated in terms of its effectiveness across the 
spectrum of military operations—deterrence, dissuading the adversary, coercion and 
defeating the enemy.  Full spectrum can be achieved through the interdependent 
implementation of operational concepts.  These concepts are dominant maneuver, 
precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection.  
8 Area of Responsibility (AOR): The geographical area associated with a combatant command within 
which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. A Combatant Command is a 
unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and 
so designated by the President of the U.S., through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and 
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or 
functional responsibilities. 
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The conduct of joint operations requires some of the capabilities that will enable 
the operational concepts of full spectrum dominance.  The military transformation 
requires commanders to provide the needed resources and prepare the environment for 
the flourishing of these capabilities.  This will, in turn, enable full spectrum dominance.  
As stated in JV 2020 some key capabilities are: 
• The joint force will have both active and reserve forces; this necessitates 
the enhancement of the reserve programs. 
• The joint force will be an all-volunteer force comprised of individuals of 
exceptional dedication and ability.  This condition necessitates the 
selection and sustaining of a skilled volunteer force and the inclusion of 
individuals with the ability to create technological and intellectual 
innovations. 
• The joint force will be interoperable.  Interoperability is the ability of units 
to provide services to and accept services from each other.  This capability 
is essential in joint, interagency, and multinational operations.  The joint 
force will operate with allies that might not be technically or tactically 
compatible with the U.S. and with other agencies that have a different 
culture, different priorities, and, in some cases, conflicting interests.  
Interoperability not only involves sharing information but also a common 
understanding of the systems, capabilities and the constraints imposed by 
the decision makers of the participating organizations. 
2. Pillar Two: Exploiting U.S. Intelligence Advantages 
Military transformation will further enhance U.S. intelligence capabilities and 
prevent competitors from achieving parity with the U.S. in the information realm.  Pillar 
two aims at transforming the current force that has certain information operations, 
intelligence, and space capabilities into a force that fights a Network Centric Warfare 
(NCW).  The U.S. military will be NCW capable with the procurement of new 
technologies and the development and exploitation of existing ones by means of 
ambitious projects. 
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The U.S. military will continue to procure global ISR capabilities to gather global 
intelligence and achieve operational goals.  The intelligence will identify emerging crises, 
select critical targets, and monitor the progress of campaigns.  This intelligence structure 
aims at dominating the whole theater and seizing/maintaining the initiative.  As stated 
earlier, intelligence will not exclude the human element no matter how sophisticated the 
equipment.  The U.S. military will gather global intelligence, using a mixture of the 
human element and a variety of technologies.  Human intelligence (HUMINT) will 
remain a part of this unified intelligence efforts.  The recent performance of the U.S. 
military during Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, is an example of the 
integration of the human element and technological assets.  Throughout the war, U.S. 
Special Forces units, operating with local Afghan fighters, used laser-pointers to mark the 
targets to be hit by precision guided munitions.  If there were no Special Forces, 
identification of targets might not have been possible with the high-tech ISR assets, since 
identification requires more than just surveillance and close monitoring.  In most cases, it 
simply needs human eyes and a human brain to select the targets. 
Space is another dimension in which the U.S. will continue to invest.  Control of 
space is only available to countries that can afford to provide their military with high-tech 
space assets.  Sensors, satellite imagery, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), space-borne 
systems, and commercial systems will be fused to provide the decision makers and 
commanders in the theater with real-time capabilities to support the operations, as well as  
to visualize the operational picture.  Even though it is questionable whether budgetary 
restrictions will affect these projects, the U.S. transformers aim at widening the gap in 
space capability. 
3. Pillar Three: Concept Development and Experimentation 
Concept development and experimentation will test the relevance and 
effectiveness of the military structure to achieve a force that can serve best for the 
implementation of the operational goals.  Concept development and experimentation 
develop current concepts by means of a continuous experimentation processes.  The OFT 
is responsible for defining the criteria and evaluating the results of the experiments.  The 
experiments test the concepts using scientific methods, exercises, prototypes, and red 
teams that are designed to have the asymmetric capabilities of the adversaries.  
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Experimentation will be supported by an infrastructure that comprises the elements of 
war gaming, modeling-simulation, joint national training capability and a system that 
processes the lessons learned from combat operations.  Apart from the OFT, other bodies 
also have responsibilities: 
The Unified Command Plan of 2002 reorganized the AORs and tasked the 
JFCOM with the military transformation, leaving its AOR to the newly established U.S. 
Northern Command9.  The Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is designed to develop the 
military transformation and does not participate in combat missions.  The idea is to form 
a “vanguard force” that can develop transformational capabilities without being 
overwhelmed with combat and “here and now” missions.  The vanguard force will be a 
forerunner in the transformation process, preventing the implementation of costly large 
scale and, in some cases, ineffective concepts.  However, the JFCOM may face the 
problem of being an “isolated force”, rather than a “vanguard force”, since it will never 
have a chance to test, under real conditions, the developing concepts that are tailored for 
a large scale Joint Force, by operating and using the experience of its own organic units. 
The services and Combatant Commands also support the central mechanism of 
experimentation and evaluation by implementing their own roadmaps, with the 
conditions of being consistent with the logic of transformation and supporting the efforts 
of other Joint Commands.  One would suggest that these key requirements are not easy to 
fulfill.  The services will have their own priorities and will tend to see the events through 
their own paradigms.  On the other hand, the Combatant Commands will be 
overwhelmed with their own missions.  In the case of the U.S. Central Command, the 
mission is an actual combat, but with a totally different nature than the course of the 
transformation. 
4. Pillar Four: Developing Transformational Capabilities 
Developing transformational capabilities is essential for the continuation of 
innovation.  There are a number of programs to develop these capabilities.  First, the DoD 
will develop actionable transformation roadmaps and promote rapid and innovative 
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E).  Second, the OFT will exploit 
 
9Unified Command Plan, U.S. DoD Press Release No:188-02, 17 April 2002, 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/b04172002_bt188-02.html> (20 June 2004) 
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the results of transformational programs implemented by the Combatant Commands.  
Third, training regimens will be upgraded, enabling the war fighter to utilize technology 
to the fullest extent.  Fourth, joint education projects will educate leaders to be 
comfortable with change, make good decisions in uncertain situations, and lead joint 
actions.  Ultimately, these programs will not only change the current structures, but will 
also change the organizational culture.  However, the U.S. military transformation model 
does not explain the detailed programs that will change in the individual’s mindset and 
therefore will have effects on the organizational culture. 
G. THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
The transformative imperatives, operational goals, military objectives, and 
transformational pillars guide the U.S. military transformation.  Continuous 
experimentation and exercises, as well as research and procurement, shape the future U.S. 
military, utilizing the transformational roadmaps.  Eventually, the U.S. military will 
develop concepts that will produce a new doctrine.  So far, a number of concepts have 
been evaluated.  Some of them, like Rapid Decisive Operations, have not been activated 
and others have gained acceptance and await real-world testing.  The following concepts 
are currently active and are essential in understanding the philosophy of the 
transformation.  For the purposes of this study, these concepts are important in selecting 
the approaches and systems that can be considered in the transformation of other 
militaries. 
1. Network Centric Warfare (NCW) 
The NCW concept aims at transforming the current platform centric approach, 
which entails the employment of mass effects to defeat the adversary in a war of attrition, 
to a “networked” approach that includes operations in three different domains and will 
evade head-on engagements with the adversary.  NCW aims to dominate the adversary, 
not only in the physical domain, but also in the information and cognitive domains.  
Networking turns the current capabilities into NCW capabilities by employing them in a 
joint manner.  Therefore, the joint force will continue to use today’s platforms and 
integrate technological assets for gaining speed of command, self-synchronization, and 
precision engagement. 
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The essence of NCW is to “network” not only the systems, but, more importantly, 
the behavior of people in the military.  In a joint force, members of different services and 
military personnel forming different units will share information and operate as parts of a 
networked system.  The U.S. joint forces can be more efficient by using almost the same 
equipment (while bringing in more sophisticated equipment), as long as they can educate 
the personnel to have a “networked” mindset.  According to the U.S. understanding, this 
capability can be achieved with the consolidation of the “jointness” in military.  The joint 
implementation of NCW capabilities leads to control of the information domain of the 
battlespace10, which is considered to be the first target for NCW. 
Joint Force strives, first, to control the information domain by attacking an 
adversary’s information capabilities.  The next step is to achieve situational awareness.  
Situational awareness is the degree of accuracy by which perceptions are close to reality, 
which is only possible with a secure “network of networks”.  Network of networks 
integrates information gathered from all domains of the battlespace to provide the joint 
force with the “knowledge” of the battle.  Next, the Joint Force that is “aware” of the 
situation will have the ability to organize itself using this knowledge of the battlespace.  
This ability is called self-synchronization and it strengthens the control of the small unit 
leaders, who no longer use the classical means of communication for getting information.  
Therefore, even the small-unit leaders will be able to operate independently since they are 
self synchronized, even in a situation where there are no orders from higher command 
levels. 
After winning the information war, the Joint Force fights to win in the cognitive 
realm.  According to the U.S. approach, the information technologies and other superior 
joint capabilities beat the adversary in the cognitive realm before the physical realm.  
Since the joint force destroys the adversary’s C4ISR capabilities, the adversary loses 
control of its own forces.  The Joint Force, which has control of the information domain 
and possesses superior physical capabilities, begins to shape the adversary’s will rather 
than punishing him with head-on engagements.  Ultimately, these “shocking” operations 
 
10 Battlespace includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; 
weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational 
areas and AOR’s. 
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convince the adversary that defeat is unavoidable.  The victory in the cognitive realm 
leads the enemy to calculate that there is no reason to continue the war against 
overwhelming U.S. capabilities.  Therefore, by avoiding a decisive battle in the physical 
realm the Joint Force wins a victory free of attrition. 
Finally, the U.S. military transformation presumes that the NCW eliminates the 
boundaries between the levels of war, services, and units.  The joint capabilities and new 
way of conducting operations will unite the planning and implementation of different 
services and units in the battlespace.  Building such a force structure necessitates a very 
sophisticated and secure network of information systems.  Additionally, this approach 
puts the individual at the center of the system since more individuals will decide how to 
utilize the NCW infrastructure.  Even if the individual is not the decision maker, he will 
need qualities similar to the decision maker to function in such a high-tech environment.  
Therefore, every individual surrounded by this environment of information technology 
and high- tech weaponry should be trained to be technically literate. 
2. Effects Based Operations (EBO) 
If NCW provides the capability for the transformed force, EBO provides the 
methodology to shape the adversary’s will.  Similar to the NCW, the EBO is an 
alternative to the classical model of warfare, which aims to defeat the adversary by 
attrition and maneuver.  EBO unifies the efforts of the joint forces, other U.S. agencies, 
and U.S. allies, by the application of military, diplomatic, and economic instruments.  
This unified structure works with a systems approach and with sound analyses, reveals 
the critical targets in the enemy’s system.  The analyses aim at the identification of the 
critical nodes in the adversary’s systems.  The joint force attacks these critical nodes and 
controls the tempo of the battle by employing NCW capabilities. 
The EBO targets the cognitive domain more than any other domain, directing 
every action to the ultimate aim: winning the war.  The crucial task for the joint force is 
to identify and attack targets that have value in the cognitive realm, which may result in 
the adversary’s demoralization.  The fact that EBO does not employ any attack that does 
not have an effect on the enemy’s system separates it from the classical war of attrition.  
While being highly dependent on the utilization of new NCW capabilities, EBO is not a 
new concept.   
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Indeed, it has been utilized by militaries throughout history.  The reinterpretation of old 
thinking by using new information technologies and high-tech weaponry is what makes it 
an effective way of conducting war. 
NCW capabilities united with the EBO approach— currently considered to be the 
end-state for the joint force—will require the joint force operate across the spectrum of 
military operations.  Since a sound analysis of enemy capabilities enables the joint force 
to attack its vital nodes, it is believed that the type of conflict will make little difference 
to the joint force, whether it is symmetric or asymmetric.  The analytical approach and 
unification of different capabilities will enable the U.S. military to develop responses 
appropriate to any threat.  Note that the systems approach must developed around the 
enemy’s C4ISR capabilities, but it is not clear that the concept will prove effective vis a 
vis the non-observable systems of asymmetric opponents. 
3. Forward Deterrence 
The forward deterrence concept provides the U.S. military with speed of 
operations.  According to U.S. leaders, the capability of taking action from a forward area 
will contribute to the ability to manage the strategic environment in the future.  The 
forward positioned Joint Force can deter, dissuade, and defeat adversaries, while 
reassuring allies, since it has the capability of taking action without accumulating a 
massive force.  Being the military part of the multi-layered defense idea, this concept, 
besides deterring potential adversaries, serves best for the implementation of preemptive 
and preventive strategies. 
According to the forward deterrence concept, the Joint Force can affect or even 
alter the initial conditions of a conflict.  A forward positioning advantage enables the 
joint forces to control and shape the situation, and dominate the adversary in a relatively 
short time.  Being unable to affect the initial conditions of crises, is a significant 
disadvantage for an industrial-age military, who can project force only after the 
maturation of conditions, and control the conflict only after suffering considerable losses.  
Currently, the Combatant Commands that have joint forces positioned in forward areas 
around the world can project U.S. military power by bypassing the strategic preparation 
phases of a war.  Apart from quick intervention capabilities, the forward-deployed U.S. 
forces serve as regional deterrence elements for the U.S. 
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Despite being an information-age military, the U.S. military is not yet capable of 
implementing the forward deterrence concept.  Forward deployment needs rapidly 
deployable forces positioned in bases located close to the areas of conflict.  Currently, the 
U.S. military has forward-deployed forces; however, they are far from being able to 
deploy for rapid interventions.  According to the Director of the OFT, Arthur K. 
Cebrowski, 80% of the military is U.S.-based (not forward-deployed) and the force 
posture needs a rebalancing.11.  Therefore, military transformation aims to develop the 
critical capabilities like deployment, forcible entry, and preservation of forward bases. 
The National Military Strategy document of 2004 tasks the U.S. Armed Forces 
with forward deterrence missions.  As the primary document for the military dimension 
of U.S. goals, the document also introduces the “defense-in-depth” concept.  Defense- in-
depth- can be seen as another expression of forward deterrence.  According to this 
approach, the threat caused by terrorist groups and rogue states mandates an active 
defense in depth.  Countering the enemy overseas in its sanctuary, securing the land, sea, 
air, and space approaches to the U.S., and defending the homeland against direct attacks 
are key components of this concept.12  These missions that enable defense- in- depth are 
also helpful in understanding the reasons for the highly conventional profile of the U.S. 
military transformation. 
These three main concepts—NCW, EBO and Forward Deterrence— are 
interlinked and an organizational construct to secure the implementation of these 
concepts is the goal of military transformation.  But, U.S. military transformation is not 
interested in final destinations.  Instead, the transformation, with its concept development 
and experimentation processes, aims to continuously transform the military.  The focus of 
the military transformation is on developing a military that can fulfill its operational 




11 Statement of Director of OFT before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 14 March 2003, 
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/cebrowski.pdf> (19 June 2004) 
12 National Military Strategy of the United States, 2004. 
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H. IS THE U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION APPLICABLE TO 
OTHER MILITARIES? 
After the debut of these new capabilities in the First Gulf War, militaries around 
the world gained a thorough understanding of their importance in a new era of war 
fighting.  This understanding was developed by the successes of new sophisticated 
weaponry, information technologies, and operational concepts showcased during the war.  
While having different missions, world militaries study the current U.S. endeavor in 
transformation and its applicability.  This possibility of an application of the U.S. military 
transformation to other militaries is an important question and is considered in this 
section of the thesis.  However, there is little convincing evidence that the U.S. military 
transformation concept can be applied directly to another military.  There are several 
factors preventing this application: 
The first factor stems from the nature and the goals of the U.S. military 
transformation, which are unique to the U.S.  The fact that the U.S. has been one of the 
world’s chief powers for the last century and the only superpower since the demise of the 
Soviet Union brings about unique conditions for the U.S.  As a consequence of its world 
position, the U.S. considers global power projection a precondition for securing its 
interests and promoting its ideals.  The transformation has been inspired, guided, and 
developed by these American conditions and capabilities.  The U.S. military 
transformation aims to achieve global superiority over potential adversaries.  Other 
countries have neither the power nor the need to have militaries that serve as the enablers 
of global hegemony. 
A second factor relates to the prominence of the U.S. economy and its share in the 
world economy.  This prominence enables the U.S. economy to support its military and 
its expensive transformation efforts on a scale that far exceeds other countries.  The U.S. 
defense budget for 2002 was $349 billion, a figure more than 23 times the combined 
defense budgets of the so-called “countries with poor U.S. relations”—Iran, North Korea, 
Syria, Sudan, Libya, and Cuba, which spent $15 billion.  In the same period, the two 
potential competitors of the U.S., Russia, and China spent $51 billion each.13  Moreover, 
 
13 The Defense Monitor, Volume 32 No: 5, November/December 2003 
<http://www.cdi.org/news/defense-monitor/dm.pdf> (19 June 2004) 
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in 2004, U.S. defense spending was $399.1 billion, while that of the three European 
powers United Kingdom, France, and Germany was $38.4, $29.5, and $24.9 billion 
respectively.14  The U.S. defense budget for 2005 is $401.7 billion and $68.9 billion of 
this amount — which is more than any other country’s defense spending — will be spent 
on research and development projects15. 
A third factor relates to the high-technology infrastructure of the U.S., which 
outweighs that of all other countries.  A large number of countries rely exclusively on the 
U.S.’ infrastructure, but even those countries that have technological capabilities do not 
have research and development budgets on a par with the U.S.  For example, in 2003, the 
U.S. spent $50 billion for research and development, whereas the European Union spent a 
combined $10 billion.16  Additionally, the Chinese and Russian scientific and 
technological infrastructures are considerably behind that of the U.S.17  Investment in 
research and development projects and proliferation of the subsequent new systems are 
almost prerequisites for the transformation. 
Other than political, economic, and technological impediments, the other capable 
countries suffer from issues, such as, lack of an advanced supporting civilian 
infrastructure, motivation, and personnel skilled to U.S. standards.  An examination of 
these factors reveals that other countries are not likely to develop capabilities on a par 
with the U.S.  This is the very fact that prevents these countries from sharing American 
aspirations which would lead to a similar military transformation.  However, the U.S. 
transformation is, globally, the most prominent transformation project and will certainly 




14 Center for Defense Information Webpage, <http://www.cdi.org/budget/2004/world-military-
spending.cfm> (19 June 2004) 
15 United States DoD, Press Release, No: 061-04, 2 February 2004 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr20040202-0301.html> (19 June 2004) 
16 Francois L.J. Heisborg, “Europe’s Military Revolution,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2002, pp. 
28-32. 
17 Ahmed S. Hasim, “The Revolution in Military Affairs Outside the West,” Journal of International 
Affairs, Vol. 51 No. 2, Winter 1998. 
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I. IS EVERYTHING PERFECT? 
There are serious criticisms of the U.S. military transformation.  Most of the 
criticisms are based on current military threats that cannot be countered by conventional 
means and are not adequately addressed by transformation.  Therefore, there is a 
continuing debate, both in the U.S. military and among academics regarding the success 
of the U.S. military transformation.  However, the U.S. military transformation is not 
complete. Moreover, the philosophy of the transformation requires flexibility or 
applicability to changing conditions, thus avoiding construction of a proverbial “Maginot 
Line”.  A number of issues resulting from the inability of the U.S. military to meet the 
current challenges yield serious criticism: 
A leading criticism is the inability of the transformed force to deal with the threat 
of WMD.  Nuclear warfare and other WMD capabilities, which have turned warfare into 
a process of destruction, are not likely to yield to military transformation efforts that aim 
at bringing conventional warfare to the center stage, a form of war fought with decisive 
battles.  WMD capability would grant, otherwise, inferior competitors valuable leverage, 
which does not even require validation in real combat.  Since nuclear weapons are 
relatively cheap and can be managed with limited effort, as opposed to a costly and 
complex conventional military infrastructure, it is certain that rivals will aim to possess 
them.  The interesting point about a WMD-capable military threat is its ability to deter 
even the sophisticated, transformed U.S. military.  This is simply because of the fact that 
the two capabilities, conventional and WMD do not offset each other. 
Even if there were no nuclear threat facing the transformed military, the other 
elements of WMD (chemical and biological weapons) would still prove to be a deterrent.  
While the conventional military can still be an effective a tool against opponents with 
moderate WMD capabilities, it is not certain that conventional means are capable of 
locating and destroying WMD or their facilities.  The failure of ‘smart bombs’ to destroy 
Iraq’s known biological capabilities during the First Gulf War is an example.18   
 
18 Gerard Quille, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the UK,” International Security Information 
Service Briefing No. 73, December 1998, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/usdefense/Quille1298.html> 
(September 12, 2004) 
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In any case, the transformed military would be extremely vulnerable to a WMD attack in 
a chemical or biological form and would even lack the protection level of the Cold War 
era militaries that considered WMD an imminent threat. 
The same asymmetry problem continues in the realm of insurgent war.19  The 
insurgent organizations do not possess the conventional equipment that a typical 
opponent would have.  Moreover, they do not have command and control apparatuses to 
be destroyed in gaining information superiority.  The unique features of the opponent—
blending into the civilian population, superior human intelligence, enlarging its 
organization in time, unconstrained in choosing the time, location, and type of its attacks, 
and being free from legal constraints— almost make it a force with its own networking 
and its own situational awareness.  The poor performance of conventional militaries 
against unconventional forces is a historical fact, and the U.S. military transformation 
appears to be yet another conventional project unable to apply its capabilities in a manner 
relevant to insurgent warfare. 
The situational awareness idea is also subject to criticism.  According to Douglas 
Macgregor: 
...it is not certain that information about the location of friendly and enemy 
forces, and their intensions, will always be available.  Moreover, it is not 
certain that everyone in the battle space will create and exploit information 
in exactly the same way to enable situational awareness.  More 
importantly, the units that engage the enemy in close combat, when 
experiencing a failure of the information network, will need armored 
protection and firepower more than information.20
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, some of the units never had the situational awareness 
due to technical problems, failure of sensors, slow processing, or inadequate networking.  
In one incident, a battalion from the 3rd Infantry Division had to fight for a bridge, with 
critical importance, without prior information about the strength of the enemy defending 
 
19 Other names can also be used to define and further broaden the scope of this kind of warfare; i.e; 
low intensity conflict, conflict short of war, counterinsurgency, asymmetric warfare and irregular warfare. 
These terms will be used interchangeably throughout the study. 
20 Army Transformation: Implications for the Future, Douglas Macgregor, Statement Testifying before 
the House Armed Services Committee on July 15, 2004, 
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Macgregor.pdf> 
(November 02, 2004), 2. 
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the bridge.  Later, the same battalion had to fight against three Iraqi brigades for the same 
terrain despite intelligence report that mentioned only one Iraqi brigade approaching the 
location.21  Knowledge of the battlespace is valuable and a can be available only when 
the information systems work properly.  However, there is no guarantee that these 
systems will function properly and that knowledge be immediately available during such 
surprises. 
The dependency of the current military transformation on information 
technologies and networking is another problem.  If networking fails, the associated 
platforms will be essential just as they are today.  However, future platforms will be 
smaller and less capable and therefore more vulnerable than today’s heavy platforms.22  
According to the U.S. Army’s Objective Force project, reduction in size, armor 
protection, and firepower will characterize lighter forces that can be deployed globally 
and rapidly, by airlift.  However, attacks on prepared positions, penetration in urban areas 
and defeating heavy armored forces need formidable ground forces.  Even if rapid 
deployment inserts the forces quicker, it may also cause a defeat rather than a victory.23
The NCW concept will reward the U.S. military more than other militaries that 
are also dependent on information technologies.  However, this approach assumes that 
the joint force will fight the NCW against an information-age military or at least against 
an industrial-age military.  However, the targets in the irregular warfare environments can 
not be engaged physically and destruction of these targets does not mean control of the 
battle.  Instead, the asymmetrical power will field a military neither of the industrial-age 
nor of the information-age.  All these criticism prove that even if a country has the 
resources to implement it, military transformation cannot provide a remedy for every 
situation.  Consequently, the best course would be to study U.S. transformation as a 
model that can guide the indigenous models of other countries. 
 
21 David Talbot, How Technology Failed in Iraq, in Technology Review, November 2004, 
<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/talbot1104.asp?p=0> (November 06, 2004)   
22 David Talbot, How Technology Failed in Iraq, in Technology Review, November 2004, 
<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/11/talbot1104.asp?p=0> (November 06, 2004) 
23 Army Transformation: Implications for the Future, Douglas Macgregor, Statement Testifying before 
the House Armed Services Committee on July 15, 2004, 
<http://www.house.gov/hasc/openingstatementsandpressreleases/108thcongress/04-07-15Macgregor.pdf> 
(November 02, 2004), 2-4. 
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J. CONCLUSIONS: 
The U.S. military transformation is a project, mandated by strategic, threat, 
technological, and risk imperatives; guided and shaped by the operational goals and 
military objectives of the U.S. defense authorities; and developed by experimentation of 
the U.S. joint community.  The U.S. military transformation is, in effect, a “uniquely”’ 
American journey with no definite end-state and it is open to political manipulation.  A 
direct application of this model is not possible for other militaries.  However, the U.S. 
military transformation provides universal facts for military transformation study and 
these facts can be utilized by other militaries. 
A comparison of the IDF and the U.S. military, in terms of the relevance of the 
U.S. military transformation’s application, results in almost the same remarks.  As in 
other countries, some American concepts are irrelevant in the Israeli threat environment.  
On the other hand, the U.S. effort is the global leader on military change under the 
influence of technology.  From this perspective, there is value in studying the U.S. 
experience in order to seek guidance and learn lessons that might be helpful in the IDF’s 
transformation endeavors.   
Accordingly, the IDF’s transformation can best be effected by learning from the 
U.S. military transformation.  A detailed examination of the IDF’s transformation 
illustrates similarities between the two projects, as well as providing valuable feedback 
for the elements of the U.S. transformation that require improvement.  The thesis will 
explore this area in Chapter V; however, a solid analysis requires examination of the 















III. ASSESSMENT OF THE ISRAELI SECURITY 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Any attempt to apply the U.S. military transformation model to the IDF, or any 
study that aims to provide insight to the development of the IDF’s transformation, should 
analyze the environmental conditions under which IDF operates.  Chief among these 
conditions is the security environment.  Since the IDF’s mission is to “defend the 
existence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty of the state of Israel”, it is salient to assess 
the Israeli security environment and prioritize the applicable military threats.  After 
identifying the military threats, such a study would examine the domestic conditions 
leading to change in the IDF’s organization and the capabilities that are necessary to 
counter these threats. 
So far this thesis has studied the U.S. military transformation model.  The U.S. 
military transformation is an ongoing, ambitious, long-term project that is tailored for 
U.S. military interests.  The unique character of the U.S. military transformation makes it 
almost impossible for other countries to apply it to their own militaries.  However, the 
U.S. military transformation model may be relevant for those countries that exceed a 
certain technology threshold and have requisite social and economic preconditions.  For 
the purposes of this thesis, the IDF’s transformational projects can benefit from the 
American model to the extent that Israel meets these conditions. 
This chapter will make an assessment of the Israeli security environment and 
develop a suggestion for prioritizing the security threats.  It will first study the 
conventional military capabilities of the countries that border Israel, and then explore the 
threat of WMD and the conventional capabilities of the second rim countries that have 
poor relations with Israel.  The chapter will also explain the nature of the threats from 
non-state actors and their connectivity with the other kinds of threats and will conclude 
with an evaluation of these security threats, culminating in a determination of the most 
important threat for Israel. 
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An initial analysis concludes that all of the military threats (conventional, WMD 
and asymmetric threats) are present in the Israeli security environment.  While the 
asymmetric threat is the most important among these threats, it is not certain that an 
asymmetric conflict would be sustained exclusively for an extended period of time.  In 
the Israeli security environment, a low-intensity conflict can flare up larger-scale 
conventional encounters and even exchange of WMD.  This instability results from the 
fact that Israel borders countries with different concerns, and in some cases, unsatisfied 
with the current status quo.  Moreover, the popular sentiment caused by the current 
Israeli-Palestinian problem may force Arab governments to take action in the face of 
domestic fervor.  Additionally, low-intensity conflict that is fought by means of proxies 
does not guarantee that state supporters will remain out of a wider-scale conventional 
conflict.  Therefore, the current Israeli security environment includes military threats that 
differ in severity but are not necessarily severed from one another. 
B. THE CONVENTIONAL THREAT AND THE RING COUNTRIES 
Currently, the principal tools of warfare are conventional militaries.  No matter 
how prominent irregular war becomes, states must maintain and field regular armies to 
achieve their many-faceted goals, ranging from deterrence to internal security.  Israel and 
its neighbors have a long history of conventional encounters and are still building up their 
militaries for a possible renewal of such conventional battle.  The armed forces of Israel’s 
neighbors, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, pose different levels of threats depending 
on the status of political relations with Israel and their operational capabilities.  Thus, an 
analysis of the rival militaries, in an order of precedence, would be helpful in defining the 
current security environment. 
1. The Syrian Military 
The Syrian military is the primary conventional adversary of the IDF, making it 
subject to continuous scrutiny by Israeli defense leaders.  There are several reasons for 
this assigned precedence of the Syrian military: First, the two countries are technically at 
war, since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War was not concluded with a peace treaty on the 
Israeli-Syrian front.  Currently, the status of the disengagement is a ceasefire agreement. 
Secondly, the Golan Heights are of strategic importance for both sides, not open to 
concessions, and can easily be a reason for the renewal of conflict.  Thirdly, Israel and 
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Syria have continued the war by other means, like fighting proxy wars, supporting rival 
organizations, and building regional alliances.  This indirect engagement may turn into a 
conventional war in the future.  Finally, the political developments after the 1973 Arab-
Israeli War—chief among them is the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, which 
ended Egypt’s belligerency toward Israel—forced Syria to maintain a large army to 
support the Syrian policy in the face of Israeli military pressure.  Therefore,  the Syrian 
military is the chief opponent both for political and strategic reasons and deserves a 
closer analysis of its forces. 
The Syrian military is almost of equal size to the IDF.  According to some 
credible estimates; the Syrian military strength is roughly 325,000.  The Army has 
220,000 regulars with 3,400 main battle tanks; 800 reconnaissance vehicles; 3,100 
infantry fighting vehicles; 1,560 armored personnel carriers and 486 self-propelled 
artillery guns.  The Air Force has 40,000 active personnel, 460 combat aircraft, and 91 
combat helicopters.  The Syrian Navy is of trivial importance with only 3,200 personnel, 
2 frigates, and 13 fast attack missile craft.  Syria's defense budget in 2003 was $5.93 
billion US, up from $5.366 billion US in 2002.24  However, the Syrian military lacks 
qualitative parity with the IDF for a number of reasons. 
First, the mostly Soviet inventory of the Syrian military is aging and Syria lacks 
the funding to modernize its military.  The end of the Cold war and great power 
competition in the Middle East deprived Syria of the Soviet funding.  Today, the 
successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia, is still the major arms supplier of Syria.  
However, Russia is not eager to write-off Syrian debts or to transfer arms with a long 
term payment plan, since it needs hard currency more than ever.  This makes the 
procurement of modern Russian weapons like the Su-27 multi-role jet, T-80 main battle 
tank, S-300 surface-to-air missiles, and modern anti-tank weapons unaffordable for the 
Syrian military. 
However, throughout the 1990s Syria managed to acquire new Mig-29 fighters, 
T-72 MBT’s, upgraded T-55 tanks, and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers both from 
Russia and other ex-Soviet states.  Moreover, Syria has aimed to diversify its armament 
 
24 Jane's World Armies, Jane’s Intelligence Review, <http://www4.janes.com> (October 18, 2004) 
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by acquiring Western weapons from France and Italy, as well as other non-western 
suppliers, like North Korea and Pakistan.  In any case, economic constraints constitute an 
impediment that will make the Syrian military increasingly obsolete as time passes.  The 
net impact of inadequate procurement for the Syrian military is the lack of a high-
technology edge to afford competition with the IDF, a force that operates with 
sophisticated armament. 
Second, the Syrian military has a disadvantage in the context of human resources.  
According to most analysts, the ordinary Syrian soldier is less educated than his Israeli 
soldier counterpart and the skill level of Syrian conscripts is insufficient to operate  high-
technology weapons25.  A number of manpower problems that explain the human aspects 
of organizational failure follow.  Poor training of soldiers, insufficient officer training, 
nepotism, political promotions, and the knowledge gap between officers and Non-
Commissioned Officers (NCO) are the main qualitative weaknesses, which make the 
Syrian military (and Arab militaries in general) inferior to the IDF.26  
Third, the Syrian military has a sectarian and highly politicized structure.  Most of 
the generals and mid-level commanders in key positions are Alawites—a Muslim sect 
that constitutes hardly 10% of the Syrian population.  Senior commanders are associated 
with the ruling Ba’ath party and they can hold their posts for lengthy terms (provided 
they gain the ability to function in the patron-client systems of the Syrian military).  
Moreover, the assignments of the high-ranking officials depend on their kinship relations.  
Although these assignments ensure the regime security, they harm military efficiency.27
On the other hand, demographic and geographical comparisons grant the Syrian 
military with advantages over the IDF.  First, the 18 million person Syrian population 
enables the military to keep a larger standing regular force than the IDF.  Considering the 
fact that a wide portion of the regular force is positioned along and within close distances 
to the Israeli lines, Syria does not need to mobilize its reserves to mount a surprise attack 
 
25 Hirsh Goodman and W. Seth Carus, The Future Battlefield and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, (London, 
Transaction Publishers, 1990), 145. 
26 Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous Prospects, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 86-87. 
27 Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney, eds., Armed Forces in the Middle East, (London, Frank Cass, 
2002), 118-121. 
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on Israel.28  Moreover, the 185,180 sq km area of Syria is large enough to provide the 
“strategic depth” that Israel has historically lacked.  Strategic depth is an important factor 
since the range and accuracy of weapons have improved, troops and equipment can be 
deployed faster, and in the case of a WMD attack, the larger area can enhance troop 
dispersion and protection.  IDF can ameliorate these geographical and demographic 
disadvantages with new personnel policies and with the application of weapon-unit-tactic 
combinations that exploit new military technologies. 
Another advantage for the Syrian military is its influence in Lebanon.  Although 
Syria decided to redeploy 3,000 of its 17,000 troops in Lebanon, in line with the 
September 2004 UN Resolution 1559, urging a Syrian pull out from Lebanon, Syrian 
military presence in Lebanon is likely to continue for many years29  The Syrian Military 
presence in Lebanon has strategic implications for the future of any conflict.  While being 
an operational ground for the Syrian-supported, anti-Israeli organizations, the Lebanese 
terrain can be a second front, enveloping IDF elements in the Golan Heights, and 
disrupting the sides and rear of the Israeli front by the Syrian trusts.  On the other hand, 
this second front would also grant new opportunities to the side that can skillfully 
implement the principles of warfare and is operationally superior. 
The Golan Heights region is at the center of the problems between Israel and 
Syria and is likely to be the theater for a renewed conflict.  The region is critical high 
terrain that grants superior surveillance and positioning advantages to its bearer.  It 
threatens Damascus, as well as, Israeli urban areas.  Furthermore, Golan Heights control 
the headwaters of the Jordan, Banias, and Hatzbani Rivers that are the main fresh water 
sources in the region.30  Therefore, the Golan Heights would be an excuse for military 
confrontation, as well as the greatest impediment for a peace treaty between Israel and 
Syria.  Israeli withdrawal from the entire Golan to the June 4, 1967 international border is 
a precondition for Syria to start any negotiations with Israel31.  Since Israel refuses such a 
 
28 Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance 2000-2001, (Cambridge, 
The MIT Press, 2001), 63. 
29 “Syria Shifts Troops from Beirut,” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3675198.stm> 
(08 October 2004)  
30 Cordesmann, 163. 
31 Sami G. Hajjar, “The Stalled Peace Process: Israeli- Syrian Track”, Rand Study, p. 333. 
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demand, the peace initiatives fail at embryonic phases, leaving military confrontation as a 
plausible possibility.  
Syria will make no concessions on the Golan Heights, but it is unlikely that Syria 
would capture or retain any part of the Golan Heights without evading the IDF’s strategic 
retaliation.  The IDF would dominate the battlespace within hours by making use of the 
Israeli Air Force’s (IAF) air supremacy, the UAV’s, Precision Guided Munitions (PGM), 
and its superior maneuver and firepower.32  Syrian options depend more on traditional 
means, making use of its demographic and geographical advantages.  A possible Syrian 
strategy would involve achieving a strategic surprise by using its pre-positioned regular 
units, inflicting as many casualties as possible on IDF, utilizing the Lebanese front and 
eventually exploiting the political and diplomatic benefits of a limited conflict that would 
last until external intervention.33  On the other hand, such a military operation requires a 
favorable political setting and the current strategic environment does not guarantee a 
positive political outcome for Syria. 
Currently, Syria is not in a position to handle the escalation of a crisis between the 
two countries While contributing to the U.S. war effort in 1991, Syria enjoyed the 
benefits of the war and evaded U.S. sanctions, but the results of the Second Gulf War of 
2003 were not as profitable as in the 1991 war.  The 2003 war effectively replaced the 
Iraqi military with the United States military.  Since Syria is on the U.S. State 
Department’s state sponsors of terrorism list, it can no longer be secure from direct U.S. 
action.  Bearing in mind that the 135,000 strong U.S. military is positioned in Iraq—no 
matter how preoccupied they are with the Iraqi insurgency—the Ba’ath regime cannot 
risk its security in the face of U.S. alienation.  The Second Gulf War changed the whole 
security environment in the Middle East and primarily affected Syria’s security policies. 
Today, the U.S. can pressure Syria for a peace settlement with Israel, demand 
Syria to end its support of anti-Israel organizations, and convince Syria to restrict its 
intervention in Lebanon. 
 
32 Cordesman, 166-169. 
33 Goodman and Carus, 22. 
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By the same token, a Israel-U.S. strategic partnership would compel Syria to operate at a 
lower-profile, with less military activities vis à vis Israel.  There are a number of 
incidents indicative of low profile military activity and a few are discussed below. 
In October 2003, an Israeli raid that targeted the Ein Saheb Camp, near 
Damascus, which Israel claimed was used by several militant groups, including Hamas 
and the Islamic Jihad, received no reaction from the Syrian military.34  Likewise, in 
September 2004, the killing of Hamas member, Izz El-Deen Sheikh Khalil, in Syria, by 
an Israeli car bomb, received no military response either.35  These two incidents show 
that Syrian military may not be in a position to confront the IDF because of either 
military incapacity and/or unfavorable political conditions in the Middle East. 
The current conventional disadvantage of the Syrian military vis a vis the IDF, 
rules out the possibility of a full scale Syrian attack on Israel.  Furthermore, this 
disadvantage implies that the Syrian military cannot support Syrian political decisions vis 
a vis Israel, even in issues other than vital interests since it cannot deter the IDF.  As a 
result of conventional weaknesses, the Syrian military will most likely search for 
alternative methods.  These may be strategic missiles, chemical weapons, and support for 
organizations against Israel.36  Chemical weapons are the so called “poor man’s 
deterrence” and may well be effective on Israel, with its densely-populated, 
geographically-small country.  Support for terrorist organizations might be the 
continuation of the Lebanese War and therefore a continuation of the 1973 War, which 
have never ended, neither technically nor in actual terms.  One can state that, Syria’s 
military threat is likely to be multi-dimensional and a conventional battle is unlikely since 





34 Israel hits Palestinian 'camp' in Syria, BBC Online, 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3165394.stm> (October 16, 2004)  
35 Syria feels pressure to reform, BBC Online 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3696718.stm> (October 16, 2004) 
36 Nora Bensahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds., The Future Security Environment in the Middle East, 
(Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, 2004), 183. 
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2. The Egyptian Military 
The Egyptian military is the most capable opponent of the IDF.  However, the 
“cold peace” that came with the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty makes the Egyptian 
military of secondary importance in this threat assessment.  While the peace treaty has 
ended Egypt’s belligerency, it has also paved the way for the establishment of a modern 
Egyptian military with a Western posture.  The Egyptian military has undergone a 
recapitalization process aimed at forming a defensive but capable conventional force.  
The build-up of the Egyptian military makes it only second to the Syrian military threat 
and this is only so because of the current cold peace between Egypt and Israel. 
A modernization project, funded by the U.S., has enabled the Egyptian military to 
reestablish itself as the most capable Arab military.  An ongoing recapitalization 
program, aimed at transforming the Egyptian military to a Western posture, will be 
completed by 2005.  The Egyptian military has 450,000 personnel (regular), 3505 tanks, 
5,300 APC’s, 481 combat aircraft, 225 helicopters, and 65 naval combat vessels.37.  U.S. 
patented M1-A1 tanks—currently more than 70% of Egyptian armor has been replaced 
with Western arms—TOW anti-tank missiles, Hellfire missiles, Ah-64 attack helicopters, 
F-16 C/D aircraft, and Perry class frigates are some of the armament representative of the 
U.S. influence in the Egyptian military.38  This recapitalization trend will continue as the 
U.S.-Egyptian strategic relationship continues to develop.  Therefore, in the Egyptian 
case, the IDF faces weaponry that can provide a credible threat, and it is in the hands of 
well-trained personnel.  Unlike Syria, Egypt has the available funding for its proliferation 
that makes its military more instrumental in supporting its national security strategy. 
Proliferation of the Egyptian military is aimed at deterring Israel.  Although a 
peace agreement exists between Egypt and Israel, the capabilities of the Egyptian military 
far exceed that required against its other neighbors, Libya and the Sudan.  Indeed, the 
Badr-2 exercises of 1996, referred to Israel as the “adversary”, revealing Egypt’s security 
concerns.  According to the Badr-2 scenario, the Egyptian military countered an IDF 
attack with a defensive battle, switched to a counter-attack, took over the Sinai Peninsula, 
 
37 Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., 114-115. 
38 Mark Heller and Yiftah Shapir, The Middle East Military Balance 1997, (New York, Colombia 
University Press, 1997), 47-50. 
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and even crossed international borders at some points.  This scenario was revelatory in 
exposing the central motives of Egyptian military strategy: counter-attacking, taking over 
territory, and in-depth attacking by the air force39. 
Unlike the Golan Heights, possibility of a conflict in the frontier between Egypt 
and Israel, the Sinai Peninsula, is lower than ever.  The Sinai is the site for one of the 
world’s most successful arms limitation agreements and peacekeeping operations.  
Moreover, the two militaries are separated by 150 miles with the partition of the Sinai 
into four disengagement zones.  These zones place limitations on Egypt’s logistics and 
support capabilities, as well as denying the IDF of a surprise land attack on Egypt.40  
Therefore, the long strategic warning periods give more time to crisis management and 
third party brinkmanship, which makes a sudden engagement between Egypt and Israel 
unlikely. 
While being the most capable Arab candidate affecting the Arab-Israeli military 
balance, Egypt’s military has a number of limitations.  First, the annual $1.3 billion U.S. 
in military aid makes the future of Egyptian military capabilities totally dependant on 
U.S. political decisions.  Second, according to military observers, the Egyptian military 
has not been successful in developing qualitatively.  The modernization of the armament 
has not been supported with C4ISR capabilities, joint training, munitions, or sustainment 
capabilities.41  Third, the Egyptian military suffers from many of the problems common 
to Middle Eastern military forces, like highly centralized command structure, poor 
training, the priority of internal security over external security, and a corporate character 
to the military42. 
Although the Egyptian military is not a threat to the IDF under the current 
political conditions, unexpected developments in other fronts of Israel, or changes in 
Egyptian polity might tempt Egypt to intervene militarily.  According to some views, 
Egyptian public opinion is generally opposed to peace with Israel under current 
 
39 Mark Heller and Yiftah Shapir, 49. 
40 Cordesman, 209-214. 
41 Cordesman, 277. 
42 Interview with a U.S. Army Foreign Area Officer who served in the region, October 07, 2004. 
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conditions and is critical of U.S. policies on national and religious grounds.43  
Considering the large social base of fundamentalist organizations, like the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the uncertainty of a post-Mubarak political environment, it is likely that 
a future Islamist Egyptian regime would make anti-Israeli policy shifts in Egyptian 
national security.  Such a possibility makes this Egyptian military build up a concern for 
the IDF. 
3. The Lebanese Armed Forces 
The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) are not a significant threat to the IDF.  
Currently, the strength of the LAF are at an all-time high of over 70,000 personnel.  
However, the LAF cannot take on the superior Israeli forces in direct conventional battle.  
A realistic scenario might involve the LAF in mounting attacks that would delay an 
Israeli offensive into Lebanon until diplomacy or a third force intervened.  Accordingly, 
the LAF has light brigades and an emphasis on Special Forces training44.  Currently, 
Lebanon claims the Shabaa Farms region that is under Israeli occupation.  This 
occupation makes Lebanon another Arab state in the anti-Israeli camp.  On the other 
hand, Lebanon should be considered an area that is open to conflict between Israel-Syria 
and Hezbollah and can have important effects on overall Arab-Israeli disputes.  Therefore 
Lebanon’s significance does not result from LAF capabilities, but from its territory, 
which would serve as both a combat zone for the IDF and a support base for its 
adversaries. 
4. The Jordanian Arab Army 
The Jordanian Arab Army (JAA) is among the group of the militaries that cannot 
constitute a threat to Israel by itself.  Although Jordan has a considerable military of 
103,000 regulars, 1,246 MBT’s, 106 combat aircraft, and 16 attack helicopters, there are 
external and domestic concerns that prevent Jordan from being a real threat.  First, 51 to 
70 percent of the Jordanian population is composed of Palestinians.  The connection of 
this population to other Palestinians and their association with the Palestinian cause, as 
opposed to a notion of Jordanian unity, makes regime security the primary mission for 
the JAA.  Second, as a small country, Jordan has historically been threatened both by 
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Syria and Iraq, making it consider Israel as a balancing factor against its Arab opponents.  
Third, the secessionist Palestinian threat unites Israel and Jordan on the point of 
developing a solution to the Palestinian problem45. 
The 1994 Israel-Jordan peace agreement and U.S. military aid are other reasons 
that contribute to the low-level military activity of the JAA.  Although there is a strong 
anti-Israeli feeling among the population, the ruling elite is committed to a solution that 
maintains the existence of the Kingdom.  This anti-Israeli feeling and the Kingdom’s 
moderate policies act as catalysts to the internal disturbances that task the JAA with an 
internal security mission.  Already, the JAA has a developed Special Operations Corps 
for such a mission.  For Israel, JAA’s reliance on Special Forces is an indicator of the 
country’s strategic priorities.  While JAA does not pose a serious threat itself, both 
because of political reasons and military capabilities, its importance can be assessed in 
conjunction with a coalition of Arab states against Israel.  
The conventional threat facing the IDF is not an urgent one.  While Syria and 
Lebanon remain in the camp of countries committed to resettlement, they lack the 
military capabilities for such pursuits.  The Syrian military suffers from lack of funding 
and lack of ally support for recapitalization of its military.  Therefore, the gap between 
the Syrian military and the IDF continues to widen.  The LAF has never been a 
significant threat to the IDF, and will be unable to develop substantial capabilities for the 
same reasons as the Syrian military.  The other two threats, the Egyptian military and the 
JAA, have Western weaponry and—especially the Egyptian military—can be considered 
guarded threats.  However, current peace agreements and the political inclinations of 
these two countries motivate them to refrain from the pursuit of aggressive policies vis à 
vis Israel.  They also suffer from the common institutional problems of most of the 
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Therefore, one conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that fighting a 
conventional war is no longer a high priority for the IDF, and this fact should not prevent 
the IDF from developing its qualitative edge or studying other militaries. Since the 
conventional military is still the primary tool of war—the developments in this field has 
important implications for the future development of the IDF. 
C. THE WMD THREAT: THE SECOND RIM AND PERIPHERAL 
COUNTRIES 
The threat from WMD is a crucial issue in Middle Eastern military affairs.  
Although no other country, except Israel, has a nuclear capability, in the past, the Middle 
Eastern militaries have employed CW on more than one occasion.  Moreover, the 
proliferation of WMD is still an attractive option for militaries that suffer from 
conventional disparity.  In the case of the WMD threat, the IDF faces threats from the 
capabilities of the second rim countries and peripheral countries, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Libya, and Algeria, as well as the first rim countries.  These threats range from potential 
nuclear threat to chemical threats, and include the limited conventional capabilities of the 
second rim states.  Therefore, it is salient to explore the WMD threat and the relevant 
conventional capabilities of these countries according to their precedence. 
1. The Second Rim 
a. Iranian Military 
The Iranian military is the major second rim adversary of the IDF.  
Although Iran and Israel have had historically good relations, the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran changed Iran-
Israel relations drastically.  The current Islamic regime in Iran considers Israel an 
illegitimate state and the greatest impediment to the achievement of Iranian interests in 
the Gulf Region and in the Middle East at large.  Iran, with its population of 70,000, 
economic potential, and rich socio-cultural heritage is a candidate for regional hegemony.  
Therefore, the Iranian military should be studied as an opponent of the IDF. 
While being a major adversary, the Iranian military is not a conventional 
threat for the IDF.  There are a number of reasons for the low possibility of a 
conventional engagement between the two militaries in the near-medium term.  First, the 
geographical remoteness and the lack of a common border prevent both militaries from 
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staging large-scale land attacks.  Second, in any engagement, both countries would 
require use of the territories and airspace of Jordan, Syria, Iraq, or Turkey, singly or in 
combinations, which is unlikely due to political restrictions and the current U.S. presence 
in Iraq.  Third, economic sanctions, destruction resulting from the Iran-Iraq war, and 
parallel structures in the military are some of the factors that prevent the transformation 
of the Iranian military into a modern force that can conventionally challenge Israel. 
The Iranian military consists of three main components: the regular 
military, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Law Enforcement 
Forces (LEF).  While the regular military and the IRGC have external security tasks, the 
LEF is tasked with an internal and frontier security role.  However, the parallel structure 
of the regular military and the quasi-conventional IRGC is an impediment to the unified 
command.  While the regular military is a continuation of the pre-1979 military, the 
IRGC has strong ties with the Islamist regime and is in fact an instrument for both 
balancing and Islamizing the regular military.46  Notably, the IRGC is in charge of Iran’s 
strategic forces and alleged WMD capabilities. 
Economic constraints and an inability to modernize Western-supplied 
weaponry make the Iranian military incapable of staging a conventional attack on Israel.  
Western arms and equipment supplies cannot be sustained and the current inventory is at 
least 10 to 20 years behind current Western standards.  Furthermore, the prospects of self-
sufficiency in arms and military technology are low47, motivating the Iranian military to 
search for alternative military means to counter the U.S. and to deter Israel.  The U.S. 
presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s conventional inadequacies 
make Iran consider the possession of WMD as an alternative to both counter the U.S. and 
to further exploit the possible power vacuum resulting from current changes in the 
Middle East security environment. 
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Iran has been developing all three classes of WMD and their means of 
delivery.  According to U.S. government open sources, Iran may have started the 
production of agents, including mycotoxins, ricin, and the smallpox virus.  As for 
chemical weapons, U.S. sources believe that Iran has had a chemical weapons program 
since 1984.  The program includes the production of sarin, mustard gas, phosgene, and 
hydrocyanic acid.  Concerning nuclear weapons, Iran acceded to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970.  Despite being a party to this treaty, 
Iran’s nuclear program, which is declared for the development of nuclear energy for 
domestic proposes, is under strict international scrutiny.  Iran possesses five research 
reactors and two partially constructed power reactors at Bushehr.  The U.S. is concerned 
that the current nuclear program is being used as a cover for the transfer of more sensitive 
nuclear technology to Iran and provides training for Iranian nuclear specialists that could 
be used to support a nuclear weapons program. 
Iran has the largest arsenal of ballistic missiles in the Middle East.  Iran 
has purchased Scud-B, Scud-C, and Nodong ballistic missiles from North Korea.  Iran 
has also developed short-range artillery rockets Shehab-1 and Shehab-2, which are 
Iranian replications of Scud-B and Scud-C ballistic missiles.  Iran flight-tested the 1,300 
km-range Shehab-3, which has a design based on the North Korean Nodong.  If Iran can 
successfully complete its development, developed Shehab-3 will be capable of reaching 
Israel.  The Shehab-3 is currently in service and controlled by the IRGC.  According to 
some reports, the Shehab-4 and the Kosar will be intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBM).48
An assessment of the Iranian nuclear development programs and the 
current security environment in the Middle East makes it clear that Iran desires becoming 
a nuclear power, or at least benefiting from the nuclear proliferation process.  On the 
other hand, Iran’s ability to succeed is restricted.  The questions are: can Iran succeed, 
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and if it can, when can it become the new nuclear power in the Middle East?49.  Iran is 
generally considered to be a threshold or near-threshold state.50  With good management 
of relations with the non-proliferation institutions (IAEA and the NPT) and with the lack 
of a U.S. or Israeli military intervention Iran can succeed in this endeavor.  Thus, the 
prospect of a nuclear-Iran should be a factor of crucial importance in developing a threat 
assessment for the IDF.  However, the Iranian WMD threat has not yet materialized. 
b. Syrian WMD Capabilities 
Proliferation of WMD is also a rational step for Syria.  The conventional 
weakness of the Syrian military can be mitigated by employment of other means, 
including WMD.  According to U.S. estimates, Syria has a stockpile of the nerve agent 
sarin and may be trying to develop advanced nerve agents.  According to the U.S. 
Proliferation Threat and Response Report of 2004, Syria will likely try to improve its 
infrastructure for producing and storing chemical agents.  Syria has probably weaponized 
sarin into aerial bombs and SCUD missile warheads, which gives Syria the capability to 
employ chemical agents against targets in Israel51.  Syria’s biological weapons capability 
is unknown but is restricted both due to the close distance between Israeli and Syrian 
population centers and lack of foreign technical assistance.  Syria does not have the 
infrastructure or the financial resources to pursue an indigenous nuclear weapons 
program.  Its China-provided 30 KW nuclear research reactor, in Dayr al Jajar is under 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.52
Syria has grown its ballistic missile program in tandem with its CW 
program.  According to estimates, Syria has 36 SS-21, 300 Scud-B, and 60 Scud-C 
missiles.  It has Soviet Frog-7 missiles and is currently developing M-9 and M-11 
missiles with Chinese assistance.  Israeli intelligence claims that Syria has made a test-
flight of the 600 km range Scud-D missile.  Moreover, Syrian programs are underway for 
the production of chemical warheads that can be delivered with ballistic missiles in the 
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Syrian inventory53.  The Syrian missiles armed with chemical warheads pose a more 
serious threat to the IDF than a solely conventional military attack on the Golan Heights. 
Therefore, a Syrian CW attack or the utilization of these weapons in hybrid 
(conventional-WMD-irregular) tactics is a concern for the IDF. 
c. Egyptian WMD Capabilities 
Egypt objects to the overwhelming Israeli military superiority in the 
Middle East.  Egypt claims strategic balance vis a vis the Israeli superiority that is 
strengthened by the proliferation of WMD by Israel54.  Although the two countries are at 
peace, Egypt made its adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
dependant on Israel’s signing and ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  
Egypt also proposed a Middle East weapon-free zone and inspections under the control of 
the IAEA.55  These Egyptian efforts are both signs of its intentions to restrict and control 
Israeli WMD capabilities and also its declaration to persevere and develop Chemical 
Weapons (CW) capabilities.  Bearing in mind that the Egyptian conventional forces are 
not capable of countering IDF, it is likely that Egypt, as in the Syrian case, will employ 
CW in its quest for strategic balance. 
Being the first country to introduce CW in the Middle East, during the 
Yemen Civil War 1963-1967, Egypt has one of the most advanced CW capabilities in the 
region.56  According to open sources, Egypt developed its CW capability to include 
nerve agents and psychoactive chemicals.  The Egyptian CW facilities are the Abu-
Za'abal Company for Chemicals and Insecticides and the Abu Za'abal Company for 
Specialty Chemicals.  It is also believed that the necessary infrastructure to produce CW 
and potential means of delivery are well developed and maintained.  Egypt has Scud-B 
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production capability, and it has possibly developed an enhanced Scud-C missile and 
signed an agreement with North Korea to purchase its 1000km-range Nodong missile 
system.  Egypt is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).57  
Although Egypt denies that it has CW production and development capabilities and that it 
has no known nuclear and biological programs, current data and its reluctance to adhere 
to the CWC and MTCR make it a threat for Israel. 
2. Peripheral States 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Libya are the peripheral countries of interest in any 
threat assessment concerning IDF.  Saudi Arabia has a limited WMD capability but has 
the longest-range missile system in the Middle East.  Chinese supplied, CSS-2 missiles 
have a range of 2,000 kilometers.  The Saudi “nuclear opacity” policy aims at mitigating 
risks in the case of a loss of U.S. support.58  Algeria has improved its relations with the 
West and with its competitor Morocco.  While having Scud-Bs and a technical capability 
for chemical and biological weapons research, the prospects for an Algerian WMD 
program are very low.59  In December 2003, after secret talks with British and US 
officials, Libya announced its intentions to give up all weapons of mass destruction.60  
This announcement was followed by the U.S. resumption of relations with Libya, the 
lifting of EU sanctions, and the start of IAEA inspections.  This shift in Libya’s foreign 
policy and its adherence to the NPT regime mitigates this peripheral threat to Israel. 
Iraq has long been the primary peripheral adversary of Israel.  Iraq’s military 
support in previous Arab-Israeli wars and its missile attacks on Israel during the First 
Gulf war are examples of the Iraqi military threat.  Moreover, besides projecting force in 
Kuwait and its war with Iran, the Iraqi military has used CW against Iranian troops and 
the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq.  However, today, none of these previous 
capabilities are relevant because Iraq is under U.S. occupation and the posture of the new 
Iraqi state is uncertain.  Currently, there is no reason to mention Iraqi military capabilities 
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and the level of military threat from Iraq will depend on the success of U.S. endeavors in 
Iraq.  The future Iraqi state can have various stances vis à vis Israel ranging from open 
hostility of a theocratic regime to the cooperation of a Western-oriented country. 
The countries in the second rim and periphery do not constitute conventional 
threats to IDF due to both a lack of common borders and incapacity of their militaries.  
On the other hand, a real threat exists in WMD capabilities that can be employed both by 
these countries and IDF’s immediate opponents in the first rim.  Iran can severely 
threaten Israel if it gains a nuclear missile capability.  Additionally, Syria and Egypt 
reserve CW capabilities as deterrent factors in the face of the IDF’s conventional 
superiority.  It is also important to note that countries in the periphery, no matter how 
moderate they are, have certain CW and strategic missile capabilities that can be 
developed and used against Israel in the future. 
D. THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT AND THE PALESTINIAN INSURGENCY  
Unlike the conventional militaries that are potential threats to IDF, there is an 
ongoing conflict between several paramilitary organizations and IDF.  Generally, these 
organizations have radical ideologies and absolutely reject any notion of the State of 
Israel.  The most prevalent of these organizations are Hezbollah and Hamas.  With the 
lack of a state that can provide for basic services, Hezbollah and Hamas function as 
quasi-states in their areas.  They also get support from Iran and Syria.  Since on the one 
hand these organizations are social movements, but on the other they have asymmetric 
military capabilities, it is hard for IDF to engage them. 
1. Hezbollah 
Hezbollah, “party of God” in Arabic, has several aims that support each other in a 
wider context.  First, Hezbollah aims to establish a Shi’ite theocracy in Lebanon.  
Second, Hezbollah considers the State of Israel as illegal and aims at its destruction.  
Third, Hezbollah aims to neutralize U.S. influence in the Middle East and French 
influence in Lebanon.61  Being a security threat to the State of Israel, and therefore an 
opponent of the IDF, Hezbollah is neither a state nor an inferior insurgent movement. 
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The fact that Hezbollah is almost a quasi-state structure that provides basic 
services, organizes social events, and manages security, makes it even stronger.  
Hezbollah is an umbrella organization that unites many Shi’ite groups with different 
areas of interest.  It has not only military and paramilitary force but it is also a political 
party, a social welfare organization, and a religious group.  Hezbollah operates schools, 
hospitals, and dental clinics, owns radio and television stations, and even rebuilds homes 
and businesses.  Hezbollah utilizes this entire social infrastructure as a base for the 
recruitment of its activists as well as a cover for its military apparatus.62
Hezbollah’s military wing has two organs.  The first is the Islamic Resistance (IR) 
(al-mukawamah-al Islamiyah), which is responsible for suicide attacks and bombings of 
Israeli targets.  The second organ is the Islamic Holy War (al-jihad-al Islami), which is 
responsible for conventional attacks against Israeli troops in South Lebanon.63  IR has 
bases in the Bekaa Valley, a support network in South Lebanon, and a strong presence in 
Beirut.  Hezbollah’s military strength is estimated around 300-500 elite fighters, 3,000-
5,000 part time insurgents, and nearly 15,000 reservists.  IR has mostly light infantry 
weapons like infantry rifles, Bangalore Torpedoes, hand grenades, as well as, anti Tank 
missiles like AT-3, AT-4, and TOW.  Moreover, the IR operates a number of M113 
APCs, surface to air missiles (SA-7), 81 and 120 mm mortars, and 122 mm Katyusha64 
rockets making it more than an insurgent organization, in fact, more like a regular army 
employing asymmetric tactics. 
Hezbollah’s strength comes from its close relationship with Iran, Syria, and its 
international operational capabilities.  While Iran has ideological motives for support, 
Syria uses Hezbollah as leverage in its own struggle against Israel.  The Iranian IRGC 
trains Hezbollah in Iran and Lebanon.  There is a supply line between Iran and Beirut via 
the Syrian airfields.  Moreover Hezbollah has training bases and can mobilize Lebanese 
support in Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina.  The bombing of Israeli targets in 1992 and 
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1994 in Buenos Aires is an indicator of Hezbollah’s international reach and 
organizational capabilities.  Currently, Hezbollah is a force in Lebanon.  Disarmament of 
Hezbollah by the Lebanese authorities is a formidable task and seems currently 
unlikely.65
Hezbollah’s decentralized structure, its regional alliances, international reach, and 
popular support among the population mitigates its vulnerability vis a vis IDF.  The 
successful guerrilla battle against IDF after the Operation Peace for Galilee of 1982 made 
the war unpopular in the eyes of the Israeli public and convinced the Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak to pull out the IDF in 2000.  Moreover, after the Israeli pull out, 
Hezbollah terminated the Israeli backed Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) and became the 
only armed force in South Lebanon.  Currently, Hezbollah continues its military activities 
in South Lebanon and specifically in the disputed Shaaba Farms area.  Although IDF 
strikes Hezbollah positions after every attack on IDF or on the Israeli population, there is 
a “profit-loss equation” between Israel and Hezbollah.  Since Israeli attacks are followed 
by Hezbollah’s prompt responses, Israel does not enjoy freedom of action vis à vis 
Hezbollah.66  Even this equation is an indicator of Hezbollah’s relative success in its fight 
against IDF and it establishes the fact that Hezbollah should be dealt with by employing 
unconventional measures. 
2. Hamas 
Hamas, the acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama a-Islamiyya (the Islamic 
Resistance Movement), is an organization that has been successful in utilizing Islamic 
extremism as leverage in its struggle against Israel.  Like Hezbollah, Hamas refuses 
Israel’s existence as a state in the Islamic lands, and aims at founding an Islamic 
Palestinian state extending from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.67  Hamas’ 
larger goal is enlargement of the totalitarian Islamic state beyond the borders of Palestine, 
which unites the organization with other fundamentalist causes.  Unlike Hezbollah,  
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Hamas cannot confront IDF militarily and its operations are limited to suicide attacks and 
car bombings in Israel.  However, by targeting the Israeli civilian population using 
terrorist methods, Hamas creates considerable disruption in the Israeli society. 
Hamas is an organization based on communal activity.  Beginning with Al 
Mujamma, in 1973, in Gaza, today, Hamas provides services in three different areas.  
First, Hamas provides mosque-based institutions that operate relatively free of Israeli 
control in the religious sphere of society.   Second, it supports educational and medical 
institutions.  These organizations enable Hamas to fill the vacuum that should be filled 
with the institutions of a sovereign state.  Third, the political organs that are active in 
Universities and high schools are supported by Hamas.  In fact, Hamas controls Islamic 
University in Gaza, ex-leftist Birzeit University, and most of the high schools in Gaza.  
These social networks and communal services, together with its strong Islamic message, 
have been important factors in Hamas’ survival, development, and recruitment. 
Hamas has a complex, decentralized structure making defeat impossible with 
classical military methods.  Subordinate units have the freedom of selecting their targets 
and carrying out their own operations, as long as they do not deviate from the general 
guidelines of confrontation.68  This flexibility, not only grants freedom of action, but it 
also preserves anonymity of the leadership.  The organization’s leadership has always 
been secret and after the crackdown on Hamas in Israel, the political leadership 
reorganized in foreign countries, out of the reach of IDF.  This “outside” leadership 
manages relations with foreign countries, raises funds, and rules their organizations in a 
technocratic manner.  At the local level, the “inside” leadership is the executive organ 
that works with the informal family and kinship contacts.  While ensuring satisfactory 
organizational decision making abroad, due to differing priorities, this two-level solution 
gives rise to power struggles between the two leadership groups.69
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The military wing, Izz al-din al Qassam, is separate from the mainstay of the 
movement and all of its social and communal services.  This separation is intended to 
preserve the civil base of the movement and more importantly it is the result of the IDF 
operations against Hamas. Izz al-din al Qassam’s confrontation with IDF has asymmetric 
characteristics.  Hamas operations include kidnapping of IDF personnel, knifing of 
individuals, shooting at Israeli vehicles, and suicide bombings against civilian targets.  
Hamas uses light weapons and explosive charges, as well as light mortars and homemade 
Qassam rockets against the Jewish settlements.70
Like Hezbollah, Hamas’s structure prevents decisive military operations against 
Israel.  Confrontation develops in a spiral fashion, as Israel’s punitive actions are 
followed with Hamas’s retaliatory operations or vice versa.  Hamas continuously 
employs its pragmatic strategies to avoid fighting according to IDF’s terms.  Moreover, 
Hamas cooperates with other anti-Israel organizations in the region, as long as they share 
a similar ideology.  IDF’s success against Hamas depends on a solid understanding of the 
organization, its relations with other organizations, as well as its state sponsors. 
3. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is one of the organizations that uses the 
popular title for Middle Eastern radical organizations, “Islamic Jihad”.  The PIJ conducts 
its operations in the West Bank, Gaza and in Israeli cities.  The organizations stated goals 
are the destruction of the state of Israel and the establishment of a theocratic Islamic 
Palestinian state.  The PIJ acknowledges a top-down approach for bringing theocratic 
rule, which has essentially motivated its founders to separate from the parental 
organization, the Muslim Brotherhood.  The PIJ employs pragmatic methods and opposes 
any settlement with Israel. 
The PIJ does not have the broad support base of Hezbollah or Hamas and 
therefore has limited success vis a vis IDF.  There are several reasons for this.  First, in 
the early stages of the first intifada, IDF cracked down hard on the PIJ and killed or 
exiled most of its members.  By the end of the intifada, Islamic Jihad was only a symbol 
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without effective operational capabilities.71  Second, during the first intifada, Hamas was 
still considered a non-militant, social organization, thus was not receiving proper 
attention.  This resulted in Hamas taking over the PIJ’s constituency after the intifada.  
Third, Hamas’s wide range of Islamic institutions, social networks, and effective 
leadership enabled it to enjoy hegemony at the expense of the militant PIJ.  Therefore, 
today PIJ is a highly radicalized organization without a strong social basis. 
While PIJ lacks the material strength, its distinctive feature is its ability to tie its 
interests and operations with other Palestinian organizations and Israel’s regional 
competitors.  PIJ avoids conflict with the stronger Hamas for the support of the 
Palestinian population.  Indeed, the two organizations have conducted a number of joint 
attacks.  On the other hand, PIJ has cooperated with the Fatah and other secular factions 
for operational purposes.  As for relations with the state actors, PIJ joined the Syrian 
encouraged Palestinian Rejectionist Front after the Oslo agreement, PIJ has strong 
relations with Hezbollah, and receives training from the IRGC.72  Therefore, the analysis 
of the PIJ should focus on its relations and its ability to integrate itself with other forces 
more than on its actual strength. 
4. Other Palestinian Organizations 
The capabilities of other Palestinian organizations are trivial.  However, there is 
no data on the exact number, strength, or even the orientations of these groups.  Chief 
among them are: the Palestinian National Liberation Army, Palestine Liberation Front, 
Arab Liberation Front, Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine, Popular Front for 
Liberation of Palestine, and Palestine Popular Struggle Front, all of which are considered 
to be under the control or cooperating with the Palestinian Authority.  There is also 
another group of organizations: Al-Saiqa, Fatah Revolutionary Council, Popular Front for 
Liberation of Palestine - General Command, Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine -
Special Command, Palestine Liberation Army, and Fatah Intifada, which are recognized 
as anti-Palestinian Authority organizations.73  In any case, no matter how fragmented 
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these organizations are, the presence of these organizations indicates that there is a large 
support base, organizational capability, and infrastructure that is interested in countering 
the IDF. 
These asymmetric threats have characteristics that make it difficult to deal with 
them in a conventional military manner.  Their socio-cultural activities, religious 
messages, and their roles as service providers enable them to enjoy a large support base 
among the Palestinian and Lebanese populations.  Moreover, the fact that the members of 
these paramilitary organizations are civilians and therefore cannot be located and targeted 
like conventional forces, make the classical IDF force ineffective.  Since these 
organizations do not pursue a military build-up, they never increase to a level such that 
they can be located and terminated by the IDF.  However, no matter how hard and 
complex, the asymmetric threat is “here and now”.  It challenges the IDF on a daily basis 
and can flare up to more severe types of conflict.  Therefore the asymmetric threat should 
be addressed by the IDF as its most important security concern. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The current Israeli security environment comprises three types of military threats 
for IDF: conventional, asymmetric (irregular) and the WMD threats.  There is rationale to 
develop effective counter-capabilities for all of these threats, and the future development 
of the IDF should consider them all.  In the conventional realm, the IDF enjoys 
superiority over its competitors.  The WMD issue is of a more political nature than a 
military one, and the IDF can only adapt its own WMD capabilities, according to political 
developments in this field.  On this point, however, the element of the U.S. military 
transformation model that aims at implementation of highly complex conventional 
operations, by making use of state of the art technology, can be considered for the 
development of conventional counter capabilities vis à vis the WMD threat and to 
enhancement of capabilities against conventional threats. 
On the other hand, analysis of the Israeli security environment comes up with the 
assertion that the asymmetric threat has a primacy among the three types of threats.  This 
is simply because of the fact that it is the only one that IDF fights today.  This low-
intensity conflict has a disruptive effect on Israeli society and it can lead to the 
introduction of other types of warfare.  Currently, the Israeli deterrence fails vis à vis the 
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IDF’s asymmetric opponents.  Moreover, IDF’s success in this realm is questionable.  
IDF should address the military aspects of the current irregular conflict and therefore the 
transformation of the IDF should give priority to the application of counter-insurgency 
capabilities over others.  However, the Israeli national defense strategy cannot tolerate an 
IDF with peer conventional competitors as well as states that can deter with their WMD 
arsenals.  These facts stress that IDF cannot ignore the other less likely threats. 
A recommended transformed force derived from the security assessment should 
probably be a flexible force that can employ conventional tactics using high technology, 
with a capability to perform counterinsurgency operations.  The possibility of this hybrid-
mission oriented force is questionable.  However, a positive outcome of the security 
assessment would be the identification of the interconnectedness of all three types of 
threats.  Therefore, an IDF that can be transformed into a highly deployable force, that is 
able to use sophisticated weaponry, and is able to operate in different kinds of mission 
environments would have positive results in meeting all three challenges.  The next 
chapter will study the other Israeli conditions affecting IDF and will explain the 



























IV. INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF THE IDF AND THE 
RELEVANCE OF THE U.S. MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter discussed the external security threats in the Israeli 
environment and concluded that the preeminent threat that the IDF faces is asymmetric 
warfare.  However, the three types of warfare, discussed previously, are interconnected 
and should be considered in combination or sequentially, one preceding the other.  This 
chapter studies the internal conditions that affect the IDF.  In conjunction with the 
external conditions, the internal conditions determine many of the challenges before the 
IDF.  This chapter also discusses the relevance of the U.S. military transformation model 
to the IDF.   
This chapter first discusses the societal transformation of Israel, exposing its 
effects on the fundamental characteristics of the IDF.  Secondly, the chapter examines 
two unconventional wars, over the last twenty years, to expose the effects of changing 
mission definitions on the IDF and the Israeli society at large.  Thirdly, religious activity 
in the Israeli society and its implications to the IDF is analyzed.  Fourth, the chapter 
presents the basics of civil military relations in Israel by presenting two examples from 
the intifadas.  Finally, the findings of the previous sections are revisited and an analysis 
of the security environment is conducted to determine the degree to which the U.S. 
military transformation model should be adapted to IDF.  This section will point out the 
unique conditions of the IDF and suggests areas that would be subject to amelioration. 
Today’s Israel barely resembles the State founded in 1948.  Over the past fifty-six 
years, Israel has undergone significant geographical, political, and societal changes.  As a 
result of the new security environment formed by the IDF’s superiority over its 
opponents, political developments in the Middle East, effects of global economic 
developments, and the increasing influence of post-modern ideas, spreading rapidly with 
information technologies; the Israeli society is undergoing a social transformation.  This 
transformation process has considerable influence on the IDF, since the IDF is the central 
institution of the Israeli nation with strong bonds to the population.   
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Currently, the IDF’s identity, effectiveness, organization, and relations with Israeli polity 
and society are challenged by the winds of change.  The IDF must reconsider its basic 
principles to meet the demands of this transforming society and changing security 
environment. 
The U.S. military transformation is a model that is based on exploitation of high 
tech weaponry and information technologies and is concerned with operational and 
organizational matters as opposed to the effects stemming from social transformation.  
However, it can be studied, and its applicability considered, as a model to define the 
characteristics of future warfare in a changing security environment.  The Israeli 
transformation must consider more than operational and organizational matters, since the 
IDF has historically been the central institution of the Israeli society.  Therefore, this 
chapter starts with an analysis of the IDF’s place in this changing Israeli society. 
B. THE IDF IN THE CHANGING ISRAELI SOCIETY 
The IDF was originally designed to be the armed force of a “nation in arms”.  The 
main rationale for this decision was to utilize the IDF as a nation-building tool that would 
unite Israel’s otherwise fragmented society.74  In these early days, the IDF was a “school 
of the nation” that played the role of absorbing immigrants, teaching them Hebrew, and 
encouraging them to become Israeli citizens ready to sacrifice themselves for the State of 
Israel.  Until the conclusion of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Israel had been under 
continuous military threat.  Therefore, the “religion of security” was the real cohesion for 
Israelis from different strata of society. 
The presence of serious external threats made military service in the IDF a 
continuous activity in the lives of eligible Israeli men and women.  The country had been 
in a constant state of war preparation or actually at war, making military preparation a 
social routine.  Participation in successive wars and long terms of service in peace time 
enabled the socialization of citizens in the IDF environment, making the IDF the most 
respected institution of Israel.  During this period, the IDF had become an institution that 
was revered above all partisan and social alliances and the Israeli system became a 
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system of “civilian militarism”75.  This idea was expressed in the early 1950’s by General 
Yigal Yadin’s description of Israeli citizens as “soldiers on ten months’ leave”.  This was 
an alternative definition of the citizen in nation state.  For Israeli citizens, service in the 
IDF had gone beyond legal obligations76, and it had in effect become Israel’s civil 
religion. 
This civil religion of Israel maintained its hegemony throughout the chaotic, early 
decades of the State; however, society began to question it by the end of the Yom Kippur 
War.  There were a number of reasons for this shift in Israeli society’s consideration of 
this phenomenon.  First, the post-1973 era –marked by the landmark event of a peace 
agreement with Egypt— posed little concern for the security of Israel.  Second, the 
development of global economic relations and successful economic policies made Israeli 
society prosperous, with an increasing interest in free trade and positive relations with the 
countries in the region.  Third, globalization and post-modern culture affected the society, 
and the security ethos of Israel faced the challenges of individualistic, democratic, and 
civil ethos.  As a result, the militaristic character of the society lost its hegemonic status77 
and this shift started a transformation of Israeli society, and with it, serious implications 
for the IDF. 
The ongoing transformation of the Israeli society formed competing social 
groups.  According to Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, contemporary Israeli society has 
three main citizenship discourses.  These are the Republican, Liberal, and Ethno-
nationalist groups (discourses).  The Republican discourse is associated with the early 
Ashkenazi elites whose ideals became the shared national program of Zionism.  The 
liberal discourse is a product of global economic movements and post-modern culture, 
and is supported by economically strong Ashkenazi and sympathizers among the 
disenfranchised groups that cannot associate themselves with other groups; i.e., 
immigrants from the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Arab citizens, and guest workers.  The 
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ethno-nationalist group involves the Mizrachi Jews and the Non-Zionist Orthodox Jews 
(haredim).  Mizrahi Jews have been the disadvantaged portion of the Jewish population 
in economic, political, and educational terms, and they are alienated from the Republican 
discourse but are attracted to its nationalist ideas.  The haredim do not consider a secular 
State the appropriate formation for the Jewish people and indeed only cooperate with the 
State for practical purposes.78
The emergence of Liberal and Ethno-nationalist discourses has weakened the 
Republican discourse and has created problems in Israeli society.  Until recently, 
republican discourse has dominated Israeli society and was influential in the creation of 
the IDF ethos.  And until recently, the republican citizenship discourse and its nation-
state and national citizenship notions for Israel, have co-existed with the liberal and 
ethno-nationalist discourses.79  However, Shafir and Peled point out that the liberal 
discourse, that is strengthened by the global socio-economic developments after the 
1960’s, and the competing ethno-nationalist discourse, that is formed by the religious 
sentiments and stratification of the society developed at the expense of the republican 
discourse, is almost irrelevant.  The Israeli state, with its strong institutions, and the 
Israeli society, with its historical memory, are still able to mitigate this problem.  
However, it is also certain that these cleavages are likely to bring instability for Israeli 
society and certainly structural problems for the nation’s military.  Since ideas like 
nation-in-arms, security ethos, and militarized society are connected with the Republican 
discourse, the diminishing of this discourse will challenge the IDF’s central paradigm: 
the nation’s army. 
C. NEW MISSIONS AND TEST OF COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS 
While the IDF’s ethos is challenged by social transformation, a more tangible 
threat to the IDF appeared in the operational realm and challenged the IDF’s famous 
military competency.  The prolonged Lebanese War, which started with Operation Peace 
for the Galilee, in 1982, and ended with the redeployment of the IDF in May 2000, 
proved that the IDF was not invincible.  The lack of a conventional opponent in Lebanon, 
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turned the battle into a litmus test for the IDF’s non-conventional skills.  And the IDF’s 
performance was seen as unsuccessful in the eyes of the Israeli society and in the 
judgment of its opponents.  The Lebanese war transformed the IDF’s image from a force 
known for its mobility and combat effectiveness to that of a static military bogged down 
in an asymmetric war.  Even more significant damage was done to the IDF spirit.80.
Throughout the Lebanese War years, Israeli society had been more critical of 
IDF’s policies vis a vis its opponents and began to question IDF’s efficiency in war.  
Civilian organizations, like Peace Now and Women in Black, increased their pressure for 
an IDF pull out after massacres in the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and after a 
series of incidents that resulted in a high number of IDF causalities.  Moreover, in 
numerous incidents both professional soldiers and conscripts refused to serve in the IDF 
since they did not consider the Lebanese War a just cause.  Furthermore, new social and 
operational conditions brought totally different conditions on other fronts.  While the 
adverse effects of domestic criticism demoralized the IDF, the lessons learned from the 
Lebanese battlefield motivated the other opponents to model Hezbollah’s strategies. 
Since it was clear that IDF was far away from its previous performance in the face 
of these new challenges, Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza adopted Lebanese methods 
of “war of attrition” that would grant similar success to them.81  The two intifadas, in 
1987 and 2000, worsened conditions for the IDF.  The new counterinsurgency missions 
were “current security missions” and they were totally different than the conventional, 
“traditional security missions” that the IDF had been fighting throughout the Arab-Israeli 
wars.  This also caused an identity crisis among all ranks of the IDF.  According to some 
reports, in those days, IDF suffered from a seriously lowered operational readiness for 
conventional war, a decreased level of functioning in combat, and diminished quality of 
training and morale.82  Moreover, the IDF personnel, especially the reserves, began to 
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question the legitimacy of IDF operations in these “wars of choice”.83  During the 
intifada hundreds of reserve soldiers refused to serve in the IDF, since they considered 
the IDF service in the West Bank and Gaza as “missions of occupation that do not serve 
Israel’s defense”.84
Generally, organizational, domestic, and international criticisms are more 
prevalent in counterinsurgency missions.  This fact adds to the factors that make these 
missions unbearable for classical militaries like the IDF.  The remarks made by Chief of 
Staff Dan Shomron accepted the ineffectiveness of the IDF in the intifada . Shomron 
argued that a solution to the Palestinian insurgency would demand IDF to act in ways that 
would be unacceptable to any democratic society.  The intifadas reveal that IDF are not 
able to operate as a counterinsurgency-capable military under the current social, political, 
and organizational conditions.  The IDF’s struggle against the Palestinian insurgency is a 
living example of the plight of conventional forces against insurgent forces; they operate 
with a totally different posture. 
D. RELIGION AND SERVICE IN THE IDF 
Another change in the IDF’s posture is related to the effect of religious affairs on 
the service, which is also related to the social transformation process.  The current 
religious-secular division within the IDF and the impact of this division on the military 
service has caused damage to the reputation of the people’s army.  Initially, IDF was 
designed as an institution in which both secular and religious people could share similar 
ideals.  This unifying structure was devised by David Ben-Gurion, who thought that 
the“…creation of religious units [would] result in the creation of the anti-religious 
units”85, implying the need for a homogenous Israeli identity to ensure existence of the 
infant state.  Indeed, during the early decades, the only significant religious establishment 
in the IDF was the military chaplaincy, which facilitated the practice of religion for any 
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religious soldiers.  However, as a result of policies throughout the 1960’s, religious units 
were formed in the IDF.  Today, members of the ethno-nationalist discourse and their 
varying approaches to service in the IDF establish yet another challenge for the IDF. 
The ethno-nationalist discourse in Israeli society has two main components: the 
haredi society (ultra-orthodox Jews) and the national religious society.  The haredim  
(pietists) are a homogenous group that considers study of the Torah to be the primary 
duty for the young Israelis who are supposed to serve in the IDF according to the nation 
in arms idea.  Therefore, they defer military service for long periods of time to afford 
time to study the Torah.  In effect, these deferments turn into actual exemptions in the 
long term.86  Moreover, the haredim argue that female conscription is not permitted in 
the Jewish law.  Currently, the haredi society amounts to 6-7 percent of the total Jewish 
population.  With their negative views on military service, and their strict observation of 
Judaism, which is not approved by other social groups, the haredi society contributes to 
the polarization of the society.  More importantly, the deferment of military service, 
which is still considered to be the primary duty for every Israeli citizen, is a cause for 
restlessness in society, posing a serious threat to the IDF’s all-inclusive character. 
While the haredi society causes discord in the IDF ethos with its absence from the 
ranks of the IDF, another problem appears with the recruitment of other ethno-religious 
group: national-religious citizens.  This group constitutes roughly 15 percent of the 
population.  The national-religious citizens, which consider military service, as much a 
religious obligation, as a citizen’s duty, are both of Ashkenazim and Sephardim origin.  
The national-religious citizens participate largely in the combat units and special sayarot 
formations and provide high-quality and highly motivated manpower.  They have large 
shares in the NCO and Officer Infantry training courses (60 and 100 percent, 
respectively, as of 1995).  Similarly, they participate in more long-term and active 
professions like pilot training.   
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More importantly, their participation rate increases at the expense of other groups 
in society, which is a risk to secular groups in control of the IDF.87  Considering this 
ambitious enlistment and attempts to control combat units, it is clear that a significant 
challenge to the future of the IDF involves the threat of factionalism. 
The national-religious troops serve in the IDF in a segregated form, with two 
main types.  In the first type, they defer military service for one year to study in religious 
colleges that spiritually prepare them for military service and then enlist into one of the 
elite formations of the military.  In the second type of enlistment, they extend their 
service to five years, during which time they serve in the military and continue their 
religious education at one of the religious academies.  These units are called the hesder 
(arrangement) units.88  While these units prove to be highly motivated, their segregation 
from other units undermines IDF cohesion.  Moreover, the fact that they consider the 
military service as a religious duty more than a civic duty makes the value of their service 
questionable in the eyes of the secular members of the IDF. 
Another aspect to the presence of religious troops is the uncertainty regarding 
their obedience to IDF’s orders in the face of religious guidance.  Bearing in mind that 
the assassin of Prime Minister Yitzchak Rabin, Yigal Amir, was a reserve hesder 
member, it is questionable that religious units will function in the IDF when they do not 
approve of decisions on religious grounds.  The assassination of Rabin in November 1995 
was a reaction of Jewish extremism to the Oslo process that endorsed the Israeli pull out 
from a part of the territory occupied in the 1967 War.  Such a pull out was unacceptable 
to various religious groups since it was a deliberate handover of sacred territory that, they 
believed, God promised to the Land of Israel.  Similarly, the manifesto that was signed by 
three principals of hesder academies and two rabbis employed as teachers in these 
institutions forbade their followers from taking part in the evacuation of settlements and 
dismantlement of the IDF bases in the West Bank.89  In other declarations, prominent 
rabbis of the settlers, some of whom were IDF settler officers, called on the IDF’s 
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soldiers to disobey orders that violated Orthodox interpretation of Judaism90.  While 
being avoided in the past, the occurrence of such religious insubordination would be 
disastrous for the IDF. 
While representation of these religious groups in the IDF seems like a positive 
contribution to its civilianization, current attitudes toward these religious groups is a 
subject of great debate in Israeli society.  No religious group refuses to fight for Israel in 
the face of an external threat; however, issues like their rejection of military service, 
segregated recruitment, and the alternative courses of action they might take under 
religious influence make them problematic for the IDF.  The resulting segregated units 
and the overall effect of different views on military service challenge the functioning of 
the IDF as a modern military.  Today this religious and secular cleavage makes the IDF a 
platform for the division of society into secular and religious camps as opposed to its 
traditional uniting role.91  Ultimately, the religious service issue must be addressed by the 
IDF to form a more capable military that can support the state’s security policies, free 
from internal conflict. 
E. CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS  
The notion of nation in arms made national security the business of the whole 
nation, and this in turn caused the formation of the Israeli society into a militaristic 
society.  Another factor that led to this bellicose society was the protracted state of war 
that made the society prepare for war throughout decades, when not actually fighting a 
war.92  The result is the abovementioned “civil religion” or the “Israeli security ethos”.  
Israeli civil-military relations developed on this basis and –while avoiding praetorian 
control of the military because of unique Israeli conditions— made the IDF an important 
political player along side the political authority.  The current societal transformation will 
affect the fundamentals of the civil-military relations since the notion of nation in arms 
will be reinterpreted or totally abolished under the current tensions.  For the purposes of 
the thesis, the change in the civil-military relations is of interest considering its effect on 
the military transformation and its nature in the transformed force. 
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A direct result of IDF’s entanglement with politics is the so-called “parachuting 
syndrome”.  In Israel, it is common for high-ranking officers to be transferred from the 
military to politics after retirement or in some cases following their early retirements for 
the sake of a promising political career.  Parachuting is a way of recruiting skilled leaders 
to the political parties since these military leaders have already been charged with 
security tasks that constitute a considerable amount of the political activity in the 
protracted war environment.  Some parachuting generals are Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak 
Rabin, Chaim Bar-Lev, Rafael Eitan, Ezer Weitman, Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, and 
Shaul Mofaz.  The last two generals in the list are the incumbent Prime Minister and 
Defense Minister of Israel.  Parachuting is a result of Israeli security perceptions; 
however, it is unclear whether it can provide the most skilled leaders for Israeli polity in 
the future.  Moreover, this linkage between the IDF and politics has important 
implications for the Israeli politics issues since it merges the civilian and military spheres. 
The lack of clear boundaries between the political and military spheres causes the 
inevitable clash between military pragmatism and politician ideology.  In the Israeli case, 
it is common for the military to reveal an opinion to the public even if it conflicts with a 
government policy.  If the military is convinced that an ideologically-motivated political 
authority may sideline its professional expertise, it can exert power on the politician by 
simply going public.  In 1997, the IDF rejected political suggestions for aggressive action 
against the Palestinians since IDF leaders thought that Prime Minister Netanyahu had 
“adventurous initiatives”.  This was because of the difference between the political and 
military modus operandi.  However, IDF did not confront the government in the military 
sphere only, in the 1999 elections, tens of retired IDF generals joined opposition parties 
or formed their own parties, and eventually toppled the Netanyahu government93.  While 
not staging military coups— the IDF does not need to do so—the IDF is very successful 
in influencing the political arena in Israel. 
Another example of the civil-military tension in Israel is from the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, however, this time with the opposite position on the part of the IDF.  
During the early stages of the Second intifada the IDF’s harsh treatment of Palestinians 
 
93 Yoram Peri in Military State and Society in Israel, eds. Daniel Maman, Eyal Ben-Ari, Zeev 
Rosenhek, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 121-122. 
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was conflicting with the moderate stance of the political leadership, which made 
commitments during the July 2000 Camp David Accords.  In this case, according to Peri, 
at the root of the IDF’s hawkish behavior was the IDF’s pull out from Lebanon in May 
2000.  Ever tough, the pull out was a publicly supported political decision; IDF was 
agitated by Hezbollah’s proclamation of the pull out as a victory.  The IDF was 
concerned about the loss of prestige and the hastened implementation of the pull out plan, 
which furthered the Hezbollah’s argument.  Therefore, IDF opposed concessions given to 
the Palestinians after the Camp David accords both for operational concerns and for 
practical purposes.  Once again, statements of CGS Shaul Mofaz and other opinions of 
high-ranking IDF officials that were leaked to the press challenged the Barak 
government’s policy.  In the operational realm, IDF continued to implement its 
aggressive strategy by granting freedom of movement to the commanders in the field 
without respect to political decisions.  Eventually, even Ehud Barak’s intifada policy had 
to adapt the IDF’s modus operandi.94
The current form of civil-military relations in Israel is typical of countries that 
where the military is considered the central institution as a result of historical or 
immediate security concerns.  The IDF is not a praetorian guard, but its intervention in 
politics, or its capability to manipulate political decisions, is uncommon in Western 
democracies.  Therefore, as the transformation of the Israeli society proceeds, civilian 
control over the IDF will be a subject open to debate in the society.  Moreover, the 
transformation of the IDF should also address the civil-military relations issue, since the 
level of civilian control of the IDF will have numerous implications, ranging from force 
structure to manpower policies. 
F. THE IDF AND THE APPLICABILITY OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
TRANSFORMATION 
The IDF, the military of a country that has been fighting both conventional and 
unconventional wars and is still unable to find an optimal solution to its security 
problems, would benefit from the new concepts that have developed from the U.S. 
military transformation.  Since the U.S. military transformation is a continuing process, 
and should address current challenges to the U.S. military, the IDF should consider 
 
94 Yoram Peri, “The Israeli Military and Israel’s Palestinian Policy,” pp. 33-35. 
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products from this process as inputs to its own transformation system.  Additionally, the 
U.S. military transformation that aims at developing the U.S. military for the future war 
that will be fought with new and sophisticated tools will certainly have implications for 
the IDF. 
So far the chapter has studied internal conditions challenging the IDF’s current 
identity.  This section will explain the degree to which the application of the American 
model is possible.  If the American model proves to be inapplicable, the section will 
discuss it as a model that can be utilized while undergoing an indigenous IDF 
transformation.  Such an effort necessitates studying the differences between the U.S. 
military and the IDF; and this requires the use of data on the unique conditions of Israel, 
as well as findings on U.S. military transformation.  And this section will utilize these 
current findings to judge applicability of the U.S. military transformation model to the 
IDF. 
The second chapter argued that, U.S. experiences in military transformation 
cannot be applied one-to-one to other militaries, and this is true for Israel as well.  
However, this asymmetry between U.S. and other countries does not necessarily mean 
that the other countries cannot exploit certain aspects of the U.S. military transformation.  
The employments of information technologies, organizational changes, and new 
operational realities have universal applicability and can be considered in transformations 
of different scales.  Moreover, Israel’s characteristics make it a better candidate than most 
of the other countries.  However, it is also a fact that Israel has unique conditions and 
these conditions should be identified in considering the applicability of these U.S. 
experiences. 
1. Why Inapplicable? 
The strategic, economic, and technological impediments that prevent other 
militaries from pursuing U.S.-styled military transformation projects also constrain the 
IDF.  The chief among these impediments is the economic one.  IDF cannot support a 
transformation similar to the U.S. military on economic grounds.  This is largely due to 
Israel’s relatively small economy, a GDP of $103.7 billion, as compared to the $10.98 
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trillion GDP of the U.S. economy.95  Israeli military expenditures for 2003 were $9.7 
billion and military expenditure per GDP was 8.7 % for 2002.  This ratio was 3.9 % for 
the U.S96.  The difference between the two ratios is an indicator of the already large share 
of Israeli budgeted defense spending as compared to American defense spending.  
Bearing in mind that, the liberal discourse in the Israeli society is increasingly supportive 
of liberal economic policies, this share of the defense spending is at risk in the future.  
Both, today’s numbers and future implications of economic development deny the IDF 
the ability to pursue projects as ambitious as the U.S. military. 
Moreover, the Israeli defense economy is dependent on an annual $1.5 billion aid 
package from the U.S., making it vulnerable to U.S. political decisions, independent of 
Israeli influence.  In such a case, the transformation process for Israel would suffer from 
lack of funds for procurement and scarcity of resources allocated for R&D.  Budgetary 
restrictions have already been an impediment to IDF development.  An example of a 
transformational project sacrificed by financial restrictions was the first Israeli combat 
aircraft project, Lavi.  Although the Lavi program achieved its operational and technical 
objectives, the Israeli Cabinet decided to cancel the Lavi program in 1987, due to lack of 
funds.  Budgetary restrictions affected the IDF’s developments in the 1990’s.  In a 1999 
article, the IDF Chief Staff Shaul Mofaz, considered the limited resources as a concept 
guiding the IDF’s operational performance, since proposals for budgetary increases had 
been rejected by the Israeli government for many years.97  For the future, dependence on 
U.S. aid would risk funding for ambitious transformational projects that could not be 
supported domestically. 
To meet the operational goals of the DoD and to fulfill the military objectives 
stated in the National Military Strategy document, the U.S. military must be able to carry 
out military operations globally.  The U.S. doctrine leaves the defense of the U.S. 
homeland almost entirely to the reserve units of the military and employs most of its 
military power under Combatant Commands overseas.  The U.S. doctrine employs layers 
 
95 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Webpage 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/facts%20about%20israel/israe l%20in%20brief/> (20 June 2004) 
96 CIA Fact book, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html> (20 June 2004) 
97 Shaul Mofaz, “The IDF toward the Year 2000” Strategic Assessment, Vol. 2 No. 2 October 1999 
<http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/volume2_2.html> (November 27, 2004) 
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of defenses and considers “abroad” as the first line of defense.  Therefore, the U.S. 
military transformation envisages expeditionary forces that can be deployed long 
distances on short notice.  Additionally, under the forward deterrence concept, the U.S. 
military maintains bases that enhance global and rapid force projection.  The IDF does 
not share this goal of projecting its force globally and it does not need forces that operate 
in an expeditionary fashion.  Therefore, operational concepts of the U.S. military 
transformation do not serve the Israeli military objectives and can only be used as 
baselines to form new Israeli concepts. 
Since the U.S. is protected with two vast oceans and a military deployed globally, 
in strategic locations, the likelihood of a large-scale conventional attack on the U.S. 
territory is very unlikely.  Moreover, other countries in the Americas will not be able to 
threaten the U.S. in the foreseeable future.  The Israeli situation is quite different, with 
the presence of conventional opponents and unresolved strategic problems, the Israeli 
military strategy cannot consider defending Israel through layers, neither can it leave 
homeland defense to the reserves.  IDF is fighting a low intensity conflict against 
Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon and can never rule out a resumption of conflict in the 
Golan Heights.  Additionally, the WMD capabilities of its opponents might be used as a 
last resort or in combination with conventional tactics.  Moreover, the current Palestinian 
insurgency is the most pressing issue and can inflame larger conflicts in the region.  In 
other words, the IDF must fight the wars of the Levant around its borders, and must 
consider the Israeli borders as the first and last lines of defense. 
The imbalance of the Arab and Israeli populations forces the IDF to maintain a 
large military.  Israel’s population is 6.5 million and 22.8% of this population is of Arab 
ethnicity.  With the exception of the Druze, they do not serve in the IDF.  Arab countries 
that have been historically belligerent towards Israel surround Israel.  As for the chief 
rivals, Egypt’s population is over 76 million and Syria’s is 18 million.  This imbalance of 
populations caused the well-known ‘few against many’ idea.  Current trends imply that 
the high growth rate of the Arab population will worsen the demographic imbalance 
between Israel and the bordering countries.  For this reason, Israeli military doctrine 
depends on having a military that conscripts almost every eligible Israeli for long service  
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terms followed by a reserve duty period.  The IDF, as a conscript army, is far from the 
force envisioned by the U.S. military transformation model that employs an all-volunteer 
force. 
Furthermore, conscription has been essential in the formation of the IDF ethos, 
since a nation-in-arms can best be formed by recruiting people from various social groups 
within that nation.  The IDF has been the institution with the traditional role that founded 
the state, absorbed new immigrants, and thanks to the protracted warfare, turned them 
into Israelis.  Therefore, service in the IDF, a civic duty, is different from service in the 
U.S. military, which employs professional soldiers.  Another aspect of this conscription is 
the unique situation created by the presence of the religious units.  The religious 
influence of these units can harm command structure in tasks that test faithfulness to the 
IDF versus faith itself.  On the other hand, the U.S. military transformation has developed 
approaches that depend on the professionalism of the all- volunteer force.  The U.S. 
transformation philosophy does not tolerate unprofessionalism, let alone insubordination 
caused by societal differences or religious preferences.  The IDF, which is a 
predominantly conscript force today, does not have the competency to perform duties that 
demand expertise, apolitical approaches, or long-term service in the military. 
Israel is currently fighting a medium-low intensity conflict that takes precedence 
over transformation.  The IDF did not fight a conventional war after the 1982 Operation 
Peace for Galilee.  Counterinsurgency campaigns and cross-border operations have 
become primary missions of the IDF.  Moreover, these operations, like the Operation 
Defensive Shield of April 2002 and 2004 Operation Rainbow in Gaza, were carried out in 
civilian environments.  To succeed with these “here and now” missions, the IDF has 
mitigated operational risks at the expense of future risks.  In other words, the efforts that 
should be directed to future transformation projects are blocked by current demands as a 
result of the insurgent war.  Although the U.S. military currently has 135,000 troops 
dealing with the insurgency in Iraq—and this unexpected cost has a negative effect in 
U.S. risk mitigation calculations— the circumstances are more positive for the U.S. 
military.  This is because the U.S. military is not fighting an insurgent war in its 
homeland, and still has available funds, personnel, and attention to commit to military  
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transformation.  For these reasons, the IDF will continue to lack commitment to 
ambitious transformation projects in the future, forcing the Israeli transformation to 
develop in a different posture than the U.S. military transformation. 
Traditionally, the Israeli military culture tolerates the insubordination of junior 
commanders.  The Israeli military has had a decentralized modus operandi, which is, in 
effect, a product of protracted wars, civilianization of the IDF, and the legacy of the 
origins of the IDF as a militia organization.  In the past, tactical unit commanders have 
carried out self-regulating maneuvers, violating the operational delineations of higher 
commands.  The performance of Ariel Sharon as a division commander is representative 
of this behavior.  In the Yom Kippur War, Sharon’s crossing of the Suez Canal was an 
act of insubordination against the orders of the COS Elazar and the Southern Front 
Commander Maj.-Gen. Haim Bar-Lev.  Since the military pursues innovation even in the 
midst of battle, it has always been hard for Israelis to carry out disciplined maneuvers. 
This phenomenon is a mixed blessing for the IDF.  The U.S. military 
transformation envisages networked formations that can fight as a part of a system.  The 
networked systems approach and the synchronization of the forces for joint operations 
encourage a centralized command and control.98  In this respect, the IDF’s character can 
be an impediment to the implementation of procedures that require disciplined action.  
There is also a positive side of the IDF character that promotes initiative among its ranks.  
Since the U.S. model encourages development of units that can act on their own 
initiatives, in accordance with their commander’s intents, the IDF way of doing business 
is already close to the this desired state.  If managed efficiently, this IDF feature can 
ensure better functioning of troops in future combat environments.  This fact is followed 
by a number of facts that make the IDF suitable for application of the U.S. model. 
2. Why Applicable? 
Techno-literacy is an imperative for the manpower of a U.S. transformed force.  
In this realm, Israel has a significant advantage bringing IDF close to U.S. standards.  
High levels of education and large investments in information technologies have 
increased techno-literacy in Israel, which results in the availability of skilled manpower 
 
98 Chris C. Demchak, “Numbers or Networks: Social Constructions of Technology and Organizational 
Dilemmas in IDF Modernization, Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 23 No. 2, Winter 1996, 180. 
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for IDF.  University graduates constitute 20% of the Israeli workforce.  This percentage is 
only second to the U.S. and is higher than other advanced countries; 17% in Canada, 12% 
in Britain, and 8% in Italy.  Furthermore, Israel has a higher percentage of engineers than 
the U.S. –135 per 10,000 people compared to 85 per 10,000 in the U.S.99
The NCW concept of the U.S. military transformation is illustrative of the need 
for techno-literate manpower.  This is evidenced by the following salient points.  The first 
battle of NCW should be won in the informational realm.  The first condition for 
information superiority is to have superior C4ISR capabilities.  The tenets of the NCW, 
situational awareness and decision superiority, are indeed in this informational realm.  
Therefore, as a first condition, any candidate that would benefit from this central concept 
of U.S. military transformation must be techno-literate.  Even though it does not match 
the current U.S. level, Israel meets a critical threshold in this regard. 
The production of high technology military equipment is essential in preserving 
the technical edge that enables carrying out operations in the information age.  Israel has 
a dynamic defense industry that produces military assets for both the IDF and 
international markets.  The development of the national defense industry was a result of 
restrictions on procurement from external suppliers that led Israel to pursue self-reliance 
policies.  As a result of the self-reliance policies of successive governments, Israel 
invested highly in defense industries.  Today, Israel's arms industry produces several 
military items including, electronic systems, radars, communications gear, intelligence-
gathering instruments, night vision devices, and targeting pods.  Additionally, Israel has 
the world’s leading UAV industry.100  Furthermore, the IDF and defense industry are 
integrated and well coordinated, with cooperative arrangements, which include providing 




99 Dan Isenberg, “Science and Technology in Israel,” 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/history/modern%20history/israel%20at%2050/science%20and%20technology
%20in%20israel> (20 June 2004) 
100 David Rodman, “Israel's National Security Doctrine: An Introductory Overview,” Meria, Volume 
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The IDF doctrine is suitable for application of the U.S. military’s approaches that 
employ forces to control the situation or seize the initiative even before the onset of any 
aggression.  Historically, the IDF has operated in an offensive fashion.  The attack on the 
Egyptian air force at the onset of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the termination of Iraq’s 
Osirak nuclear facility in 1981 are representative of Israel’s adherence to preemptive and 
preventive operations.  According to security experts, Israel needs to maintain an agile 
force that can attack any adversary in the early stages of aggression with short notice, 
since it would be very hard for the IDF to seize the initiative if the adversary preempts.  
On this point, U.S. transformation envisions a force capable of short notice intervention 
in preemptive strikes with a capability to function preventively, which addresses some of 
the IDF’s strategic concerns. 
The IDF has several advantages in the technological and doctrinal areas that make 
it a good candidate for the application of the U.S. military transformation model, 
however, a total application is not possible both because of unique Israeli features and 
because of the fact that the transformation is tailored for the U.S. military.  The IDF has 
its own strategic, technological, and societal realities, making it a military with regional 
ambitions, quite different from the transformation aims of the U.S., which require 
creation of a military with global reach.  Therefore, if the IDF is a candidate that might 
benefit from U.S. transformation experiences, the efforts should first be directed on the 
features and conditions that are unique to the IDF.  Moreover, the IDF must address a 
number of issues like manpower policy, identity, force structure, mission definition, civil 
military relations, and strategic priorities. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The IDF has played the leading role in Israel’s nation building process.  For 
decades, the IDF has been the “citizen’s army” and has united an Israeli population that 
involves people from very different backgrounds.  The IDF has been the school of nation 
that has educated ordinary people on “Israeliness” and has served as a breeding ground 
for the nation’s political leadership.  However, current social change, motivated by a 
number of internal and external factors, challenges the IDF’s identity and in turn has 
eroded its central position.  The liberal discourse has challenged the IDF’s operational 
competency and moral values.  The ethno-religious discourse has caused distress both 
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with its segregated service in the IDF and with its evasion of the IDF service, still a civic 
duty in Israel.  The conflict with the Palestinians has turned the IDF into an offensive 
counterinsurgency force with a conventional structure, bringing criticism from both 
domestic and international audience. 
By ending state consolidation in Israel, the IDF is likely to transform to a different 
posture, as a result of both a new societal posture and a change in the character of its new 
missions.  However, it is not possible to predict a new identity for Israelis, and this is a 
sociological issue rather than a security issue.  On the other hand, IDF is a security 
institution and the social transformation has little to change about its mission, since 
security is a not a variable but a constant in any country’s politics.  The IDF’s task should 
be examining the current environment and change itself to be able to carry out its mission 
in the face of future threats. 
These changes in the IDF cannot be modernization or recapitalization projects 
that aim at technological sophistication, procurement, and maintenance of platforms and 
systems.  The real change in the IDF should be military transformation that addresses 
social, organizational, and cultural issues, as well as, technical and doctrinal issues.  On 
this point, the U.S. military transformation is salient and the IDF and the U.S. military 
transformation are not incompatible.  Therefore, the next chapter will discuss the degree 
of the IDF’s achievement in its ongoing transformation in U.S. terms and will search for 































V. THE IDF TRANSFORMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed the U.S. military transformation model, 
explained the IDF’s security environment, and identified those characteristics that 
determine the issues that need to be addressed in the IDF’s transformation.  The previous 
chapters concluded that, despite the fact that U.S. transformation is designed for the 
unique conditions of the U.S. military, it does not prevent other militaries from adapting 
the model or at least drawing benefits from it.  In fact, the IDF, with its technological 
edge and urgent security concerns, is among the best candidates to demonstrate how the 
U.S. transformation could be applied to other militaries. 
This chapter studies the IDF’s transformation in the context of the U.S. 
transformation model.  It argues that Israeli transformation has benefited greatly from the 
U.S. model, but the IDF needs to address a number of issues to achieve the “real 
transformation” that comes from organizational and cultural dimensions rather than the 
structural and technical ones.  It doing this, a review of the IDF’s transformational 
programs, starting from the mid-1990’s, is presented.  Following this, the chapter 
identifies changes in the IDF that can be implemented from an application of the U.S. 
model, and discusses the issues that can be ameliorated by using U.S. military 
transformational approaches.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of these 
findings. 
To offer successful solutions to the IDF’s emerging challenges, one must consider 
the U.S. model from an Israeli context.  First, applicable U.S. concepts should benefit the 
IDF in developing an effective counterinsurgent force that operates with professional 
personnel.  Second, the concepts should focus on strengthening the technological edge of 
the IDF to achieve networked behavior.  Third, transformation should develop long-reach 
capabilities that are required against the over-the-horizon threats of the future.  Finally, 
the U.S. transformation should be absorbed in the sense that it stresses the role of 
knowledge and a change of organizational culture in the IDF. 
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The U.S. transformation model offers a long list of transformational concepts.  
Some of these concepts are only applicable to the U.S. military, and fall short of 
addressing some of Israel’s security concerns.  However, the large scale projects/concepts 
are still salient.  First, the NCW concept that utilizes information technologies to 
dominate the information realm has applicability in the IDF.  Second, the idea of 
jointness, together with its organizational, structural, and technological aspects, can be 
utilized by the IDF.  Third, as a result of the above capabilities, the IDF can think on the 
EBO to avoid classical attrition battles.  Finally, the preventive character of forward 
deterrence strategy may have implications for the IDF’s long reach capabilities that will 
strengthen the IAF and Israeli Navy (IN) and will lead to joint execution of operations.  
In the search for the application of such ideas, it is necessary  first to identify and 
understand what the IDF has applied concerning U.S. concepts. 
B. TRANSFORMATION UNDERWAY: A REVIEW OF THE LATEST 
PLANS OF THE IDF 
While on a smaller scale and comprising only relevant U.S. concepts, the IDF’s 
transformation projects are not indigenous force development efforts.  The IDF has an 
ongoing transformation process that has been applying concepts and technologies 
introduced by the U.S. military transformation.  Starting from the early 1990’s—the 
debut of new U.S. capabilities in the First Gulf War impressed the Israeli leaders— the 
IDF’s transformation projects have aimed at utilizing new information technologies and 
high technology weaponry.  Moreover, like the U.S. military, the IDF has considered 
organizational and doctrinal changes to make the force structure functional with these 
new technologies.  The relatively favorable political conditions of the 1990’s motivated 
Israeli leaders, like Ehud Barak, to exploit this “window of opportunity” by promoting a 
“slimmer and smarter” IDF101. 
The IDF has four publicly known transformational projects.  While some of these 
are intermediate term projects that have suffered from a lack of funding, some of them 
are long term projects that reflect the envisaged force posture of the IDF.  In the last 15 
years the Israeli security environment has undergone crucial changes that have brought 
debate on the relevance of transformational projects altogether.  Therefore, interim 
 
101 A term first used by the IDF Chief of Staff Dan Shomron in late 1980’s. 
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projects and some goals of the long term projects have been amended over time and have 
lost funding.  However, the recent transformation efforts of the IDF have been on a 
similar track with those of the U.S.  The four publicized projects are the following: 
1. Crossword 2000 
The Crossword (Zahal) 2000 plan was announced in July 1999.  Crossword 2000 
included the organizational restructuring of the IDF’s chain of command and its 
responsibilities.  The Crossword 2000 plan outlined a new role for the IDF’s Ground 
Forces Command, under a new name.  The new Ground Forces Service (GFS) lost its 
operational control over the regional commands and was tasked with force build up and 
overall command of the training of army branches like infantry, artillery, armor, and 
combat engineering.  The GFS’s other responsibilities included weapons development 
and manpower procurement for the Ground Forces.  Another fundamental change was the 
formation of the Operations Directorate under the Chief of General Staff.  This new 
division was tasked with planning and coordination of IDF operations102, a task 
previously coordinated by the Deputy COS.  The motivation of these steps was to relieve 
the senior leadership from overseeing the detailed processes of force development and 
operational planning. 
Crossword 2000 is a serious restructuring endeavor aimed at transforming the 
compact peace time IDF — that only becomes fully operational during mobilization, with 
the inherent risk of having critical positions manned with civilian soldiers — into a 
standing regular military.  The IDF has been moving away from its narrow and uniform 
structure, which has restricted both the training and operational command to the Chief of 
Staff and its headquarters, to a more diversified and professional one.  Moreover, the 
establishment of the Operations directorate as a coordinating body and the autonomy 
granted to the Regional Commands in operational matters are reminiscent of a 
decentralized command structure that permits the sub-components a higher degree of 
autonomy. 
 
102 Jerusalem Post; 6/30/1999; Arieh O'sullivan,” IDF launches new ground forces,” 
<http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?DOCID=1P1:22023834&num=1&ctrlInfo=Round9b%3APro
d%3ASR%3AResult&ao> (November 18, 2004) 
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The command structure introduced with Crossword 2000 is in line with the U.S. 
model, and can be compared to the early U.S. transformation associated with the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.  According to the new organization explained in this act, 
the U.S. Combatant Commands enjoy a high degree of autonomy in the planning and 
execution of operations in their AOR’s.  The Combatant Commanders are not responsible 
to any service.  Instead, the chain of command runs from the president to the Secretary of 
Defense and to the Combatant Command.  (CJCS advises the National Security Council 
and oversees the combatant commands with the president’s directive)103.  Similarly, the 
current IDF organization strengthens the regional commands and leaves the Ground 
Forces Command out of operational matters, similar to the U.S. system.  This 
organization also enables higher echelons of the IDF to focus on strategic issues and keep 
an overall perspective. 
2. Idan 2003 
The Idan (Epoch) 2003 plan was designed before the Second Intifada under 
political circumstances that preserved prospects for a settlement of the Palestinian issue.  
This plan is one of the short term attempts at IDF transformation and has suffered from 
budgetary restrictions.  Idan 2003 was motivated by an Israeli security assessment that 
concluded, at the time, the IDF did not face any imminent threats, and this resulted in a 
shift of funds to support long-range defense buildup and R&D104.  The focus of this plan 
was to make the IDF more operationally efficient in the face of long range missile threats.  
The deep-strike capabilities and readiness of the IDF were other key issues addressed in 
Idan 2003.  Additionally, the plan aimed at making the IDF less reliant on the reserves.  
Although it was a step away from the citizen’s army,—and the plan cut some 3,000 
positions from the IDF’s professional forces— Idan 2003 made no suggestion for a 
professional military.   
 
 
103 Goldwater-Nicholas Department of Defense Organization Act, Public Law 99-433, October 1, 
1986, <http://www.ndu.edu/library/goldnich/99433pt1.pdf> (November 17. 2004) 
104; Arieh O. Sullivan, “The most expensive battle of all”, Jerusalem Post, August 20,1999, 
<http://www.highbeam.com/library/doc3.asp?DOCID=1P1:22884343&num=3&ctrlInfo=Round9b%3APro
d%3ASR%3AResult&ao> (November 17, 2004) 
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Although this plan focuses on IDF development that is in line with U.S. models, the fact 
that Idan 2003 does not consider development of a professional military, reveals that the 
issue of manpower in the IDF is not a simple one, resolved simply by transformational 
plans, but is a complex one, with further implications on the IDF’s central role in Israeli 
public life. 
3. Idan 2010105
Idan 2010 was Israel’s first long term transformation project in recent decades.  
Like the intermediate projects of Crossword 2000 and Idan 2003, Idan 2010 aimed at 
adapting the IDF to the emerging security environment, under the optimism of the Oslo 
process of late 1990’s.  Another rationale — quite similar to the third pillar of the U.S. 
military transformation that aims to exploit U.S. advantages in intelligence capabilities — 
was the notion of exploiting the “window of opportunity” and thus further enhance the 
IDF’s qualitative edge.  This notion surfaced, specifically, in considering the IAF’s 
modernization project that was started to gain the capability to operate in distant theaters.  
This notion is also in line with the U.S. military transformation’s concept of employment 
of the airpower as an equal—if not a superior one in some cases— partner with the 
ground forces. 
Idan 2010 looked like a modernization project, but it also had transformational 
implications.  For the IDF ground elements, the plan foresaw the need for an increase in 
the number of Merkava Mk 3 main battle tanks (MBT) and development of the Merkava 
Mk 4 MBT.  Israeli military experts did not consider modernization of the old generation 
tanks to be cost-effective and out of necessity, some recommended replacing armored 
divisions with independent brigade groups with these new MBT’s.  Furthermore, the 
combat mix of the IDF was enriched with the proliferation of high-technology weapon 
systems like PGM’s, missiles, UAV’s, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UACV), and 
space systems.  This application of sophisticated information warfare technologies was in 
keeping with this priority for IDF transformation. 
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The IAF has also had a large contribution to the Idan 2010 plan.  In an effort to 
support the goal to develop long reach capabilities for the IDF, the plan included the 
acquisition of 110 F-16I fighters and a new type of advanced aircraft, like the F-22 
Raptor or the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  The helicopter fleet of the IAF would include the 
new AH-64 Longbow Apache and UH-60 Black Hawk as the standard aircraft.  
Furthermore, Idan 2010 also suggested acquiring in-flight refueling tankers, airborne 
early warning, and airborne surveillance aircraft.  As for missile defense, the plan 
targeted deployment of at least three Arrow batteries supported by Patriot PAC-3 by the 
year 2010.  This reveals that the IAF’s modernization pattern aims at countering the 
WMD threat against Israel.  Furthermore, this aspect of the plan has implications beyond 
WMD defense.  It enables the IDF to project air power beyond its borders, which is 
indicative of an understanding of the effectiveness of superior airpower and its role in 
preventive operations. 
4. Kela 2008 
Kela (Catapult) 2008 was the last IDF transformation plan developed after the 
Second Gulf War.  Kela 2008 aimed at preparing for conventional war, while recognizing 
the importance of the current asymmetric conflict.  The original plan, of 2002, was 
designed to achieve transformation by continued investment in R&D by reducing 
personnel and platforms in all three services.  Indeed, the IDF ground forces saw the 
largest reduction, with a 10% reduction in its forces, with personnel cuts from mostly 
non-combat positions.  The logic was to save funds by maintaining a smaller military in 
the face of budgetary limitations.  For Ground forces, following Idan 2010, Kela 2008 
replaced divisions with brigade-sized units and implemented new organizational 
structures.106
The plan also dealt with the AOR’s for the regional commands.  Currently the 
Northern Command carries out operations against Hezbollah and its primary mission, 
which is countering the Syrian military in the Golan, has naturally lost its importance, 
with the decline of Syria’s military threat.  The Central Command, with the absence of a 
threat from Jordan, has been assigned the role of dealing with the Palestinian insurgency 
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in the West Bank.  Finally, the Southern Command carries out operations in the Gaza, 
making its mission against the Egyptian military of secondary importance.  The plan, and 
the ensuing debate, resulted in proposing the idea of merging counterinsurgency 
operations under one command, responsible for both the West Bank and the Gaza.  
Therefore, the current Southern Command would be unnecessary, and its role vis a vis the 
Egyptian threat, would be taken over by the Ground Forces Service in times of crisis.  
Additionally, the formation of Strategic Command was proposed, — an idea that has long 
been toyed with by Israeli security experts — which would unite ground, sea and, air 
force efforts for long range operations.107  Strategic Command would be a step towards 
jointness in the IDF, and would enable the IDF to carry out long-range operations 
utilizing the joint capabilities of the three services and the synergy of unified planning. 
Other main issues considered in Kela 2008 were reductions in reserve duty 
(eventually, reserves will no longer serve along Israel’s border and in the West Bank and 
Gaza), the application of information technologies in support of the ground forces, and 
development of advanced C4ISR capabilities.  All of these transformational efforts are in 
line with the U.S. military transformation, and with the exception of manpower reduction, 
would be relevant if applied to the U.S. military.   
While being a continuum of the previous Israeli efforts, Kela 2008 (and its 
modified version Kela 2009) comprises the ultimate steps for the IDF’s application of 
these global trends into its own organization.  However, like the U.S. military 
transformation, the IDF’s recent transformational projects cannot follow a certain track, 
in practice, because of changing conditions and the large-scale debate on the relevance of 
the new projects. 
Recently, the IDF’s transformation projects have been questioned by the 
emergence of new conditions.  Mostly, young officers, whose combat experience has 
been gained from the Palestinian conflict, argue that the main task for the IDF is 
counterinsurgency.  Critics also argue that the IDF’s current doctrine was developed after 
the traumatic experience of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the current senior IDF 
leaders, who were young officers then, are under the influence of these early experiences.  
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Moreover, the critics also accuse the Israeli intelligence apparatus of not foreseeing the 
end of the threat from the Eastern Front and the isolation of Syria after the Second Gulf 
War.108  Therefore, the current critics of the Israeli transformation favor the application 
of technologies and new doctrines that serve the purposes of sub-conventional warfare.  
To explain this trend in Israeli transformation, an examination of the projects that relate 
to sub-conventional warfare is required, as is a determination of those that reflect some 
aspect of the U.S. military transformation. 
C. IDF’S TRANSFORMATION IN U.S. TERMS 
The IDF’s transformational projects have resulted in observable changes in the 
force structure.  While being responsive to the asymmetric security threats of the Israeli 
security environment, these changes also reflect some aspects of the U.S. military 
transformation.  The integration and networking of information technologies and the 
resultant improvement in the IDF situational awareness, act as reminders of the U.S. 
NCW concept.  Technological contributions like C4ISR systems and platforms aim at 
development of jointness in the IDF.  Moreover, organizational changes and new 
manpower policies are Israeli steps in the formation of joint forces in the IDF.  In other 
words, recent Israeli implementations expose the level of application of the U.S. military 
transformation in the IDF. 
1. Information Technologies and Digitalization 
In March 2003, the IDF inaugurated its C4I directorate.  The new directorate, seen 
as a central element in the IDF’s force structure, manages a network of ground, air, sea, 
and space systems, which enables communication between IDF units, with the national 
command authority, and with the intelligence services.  The C4I directorate also 
implements information warfare doctrine, defines military requirements, and sets policies 
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Ultimately, the directorate will manage the master plan that aims at developing a 
network from the individual to the corps level.109  IDF’s investment in information 
technologies have resulted in a number of plans aimed at integrating various systems and 
providing units with knowledge of the future battlefield. 
The IDF’s, multi-year, Ground Forces Digitalization program aims to integrate 
the Israeli command, control, and communications (C3) systems to achieve an inter-
networked force.  The $200 million project is being developed with the assistance of 
several Israeli high tech firms.  The project is developed around the idea of “linking the 
sensor to the shooter”, and will be possible by investing in advanced C4I hardware and 
software technologies.  The targeted information capability will provide situational 
awareness for maneuvering elements and will enhance coordination between different 
command levels.  Ultimately, this investment in the information field will result in 
positive outcomes in the physical realm, thus improving the overall operational 
capabilities of the IDF Ground Forces.110
Systems in the digitalization program will support various communication modes, 
like cellular, wireless LAN, radio HF/VHF, and serial communication ports, and will 
enable better force deployment, movement tracking, and coordination between adjacent 
units.  The new systems will provide units with the GPS (Global Positioning System) and 
ability to share operational data in a secure form.  These systems will provide digital 
maps to the units and will also be utilized in logistics.111  Moreover, the new systems will 
transfer video, taken by UAV’s, to the unit commanders and weapon systems in the field, 
making command control and target acquisition easier.112
One specific example of the digitalization project is the Tacter-31 Ruggedized 
Handheld Computer (RHC) system.  Tacter-31 is a multipurpose handheld personal 
computer and digital messaging terminal designed to serve all combat echelons in the 
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battlespace.  This hand held computer has an internal GPS receiver and mapping 
capabilities.  The IDF has purchased 1000 of these computers for its units in the West 
Bank.  Another application is the utilization of these handheld computers at various 
security check points.  Since the computers contain information about wanted and 
permitted Palestinians, IDF personnel, at the check points, can identify and track these 
personnel easily.113  Ultimately, the IDF aims at setup of a tactical internet system by the 
integration of off-the-shelf technologies.  This tactical internet system will provide 
telephony, data, e-mail, fax, and video capabilities to the units in the field, as well as, 
different echelons in the IDF.114
Another such project is Infantry 2000 that aims to treat the soldier as another 
tactical platform.  According to Infantry 2000, the soldier collects and distributes the 
same information and uses the same infrastructure, dynamic map systems, and 
communicates like the other elements of the tactical battlespace.  The Israeli infantry 
suite will comprise helmet and weapon mounted sensors, weapon mounted fire control 
system, head and weapon mounted display and sights, a wearable computer, navigation 
systems, and voice communications.115  The IDF’s battalion combat team Internet 
protocol (IP) will integrate the information provided by the soldier in the field.  The other 
elements of the battalion combat team are armor, infantry, field engineering, artillery, 
mortars and logistics assets supported by other components such as helicopters, air 
defense systems and special forces.  The sharing of the information will enable total 
coordination between different elements of the battalion combat team, as well as, 
informing the units about the location of target, enemy and friendly forces.116
The integration of UAV’s into the ground forces’ operations is also an important 
step for the IDF’s technological development.  With their various sizes and stand-off 
capabilities, UAV’s can perform target detection and recognition missions and can 
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transfer imagery in real-time to IDF networks.  The production of two specific types will 
result in considerable improvement to the small units of the IDF.  The Mosquito-1 micro 
UAV weighs only 250 grams and has a wing span of about 30 cm.  The vehicle is 
launched by hand, carries a miniature video camera, and lands on its skids at the end of 
its mission.  The Mosquito 1 can spend up to 40 minutes in the air.117  The second type is 
the BirdEye 100 backpackable UAV.  This UAV weighs 1.3 kilogram, has a wingspan of 
85 centimeters, and can spend up to one hour in the air.  It is a low altitude vehicle that 
can provide the infantry and armor units with live video and over-the-hill intelligence.  
BirdEye 100 can be controlled by a laptop, on the ground, and the communication and 
data link can be maintained within 5 kilometers.118
The IDF’s technological investments also aim at forming a “network of networks” 
that will enable the collection and distribution of information between lower and higher 
levels of the military.  The IDF will utilize superior information capabilities to conduct 
operations with superior knowledge of the battle.  The IDF’s investment in the 
information realm is similar to that of the U.S. military’s programs, and the IDF employs 
similar technologies for many of the same purposes.  The IDF’s development in the 
technological realm reveals a good understanding and successful implementation of the 
U.S. NCW concept. 
2. Strategic Arms and Israel’s Long-Arm 
Israel’s ambitious military space programs provide the IDF with superior 
reconnaissance, communications, and surveillance capabilities.  The Ofeq series are high-
resolution imaging satellites, and currently Ofeq-5 is in orbit.  Ofeq-5 monitors military 
developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran with its high-resolution cameras.  More developed 
satellites of this series are still under development and three new models are believed to 
be scheduled for launch around 2007/2008.119  Eros is the remote sensing, dual-use 
satellite series.  The Eros-A1 satellite provides one-meter resolution images for both 
defense and commercial purposes.  The Amos-2, which was launched in December 2003, 
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is the military communications satellite.  Another more powerful satellite, twice the size 
of Amos-2, and also dedicated solely to military communications, is planned for launch in 
late 2004.120  The space program makes the IDF the only country in the region with a 
qualified information capabilities supported by space-borne surveillance systems. 
The IDF aims to counter the strategic missile threat by developing its own anti-
missile system.  Arrow Weapon System (AWS) is a joint Israel-U.S. venture that is being 
developed to meet the IDF’s requirement for an interceptor for defending military assets 
and population centers in Israel.  The Arrow II system can detect and track incoming 
missiles, as far as 500 km, and can intercept missiles 50-90 km away.  The command and 
control system is designed to respond to as many as 14 simultaneous intercepts.  
Currently, there are two Arrow batteries deployed in Israel.  The third battery will be 
deployed in the near future.  Joint U.S.-Israeli experiments are continuing for 
development of the Arrow II battery.121
The low-altitude air-defense system, the Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser 
(THEL) program is designed to counter short-range rockets.  The threat from ballistic 
missiles, especially the Katyusha missiles of Hezbollah and the Qassam missiles fired 
from Gaza, motivated the IDF to develop the THEL.  The THEL is currently under 
development by a joint Israel-U.S. team, and in testing, proved to be the first laser 
capable of destroying a ballistic missile.  If advanced testing proves the THEL concept, a 
wider application of the THEL will be designed to intercept artillery shells, and this 
version will be mounted on a tactical vehicle.122  Apart from destroying short range 
missiles, the THEL can make important contributions to conventional warfare, since it 
will have wider application on land warfare if mounted and made more accurate. 
3. Force Development and Restructuring 
The IDF is undergoing organizational changes in the face of the ongoing Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC) concept.  According to Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, IDF 
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Ground Forces Commander, the armor divisions are being turned into “assignment 
driven” divisions that will be able to operate most effectively, in areas they gain 
experience in, as a result of successive operations in these regions.123  Also, the 
restructuring that was planned in Kela 2008, will restore the brigade as the tactical unit of 
action.  Therefore, the IDF division commanders will not be leading the battle in the 
future.  Leaving the command to the multi-functional brigade commanders, the division 
commanders will not lead but manage the battle.  This restructuring is also reminiscent of 
the U.S. Army projects that consider brigade-sized units as the Units of Action (UA). 
The multi functional IDF brigades will be based on the Merkava 3 and mostly 
Merkava 4 tanks.  Merkava 4 will reduce the number of tanks in an IDF tank Platoon 
from the current number of four to two, and in a Company from 11 to 7.  This new 
system is called the “elementary cube system”, and will enable autonomous maneuver 
and fire management at the lower levels for tank units.  Moreover, the low number of 
vehicles in the higher command levels will make command-control easier.124  This will 
have doctrinal implications for the IDF.  However, budget restrictions and organizational 
criticism about the relevance of the tanks are impediments to this restructuring of the 
divisions.  On the other hand, IDF’s continuing reliance on tanks differentiates the IDF 
transformation from the envisaged U.S. transformation in that U.S. Ground forces favor 
lighter and deployable forces comprised of wheeled vehicles. 
While keeping tanks the primary vehicle of land war, the IDF has also 
restructured a portion of its force for counterinsurgency (COIN) missions.  IDF has 
organized territorial divisions in the West Bank and Gaza.  These divisions conduct 
routine security operations and are therefore familiarized with their AOR’s.   
There are six COIN battalions in these territories, and they are supported by 
mechanized brigades in large scale operations.  Additionally, the support elements in 
these territorial units train for the COIN missions because of the character of their 
missions. 
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Modernization of the IDF infantry and its protection is also another consideration 
in Israeli transformation.  The COIN missions have increased the importance of infantry 
in the IDF.  Currently, under the territorial divisions, the IDF infantry is mostly tasked 
with COIN missions.  However, the infantry is also an integral part of conventional war.  
The IDF has been searching for an armored personnel carrier (APC) that can be used in a 
variety of missions ranging from urban combat to future conventional wars. 
The standard APC of the IDF is the M113, which is an aging system and cannot 
provide adequate protection.  While there are efforts to upgrade the M113, it is 
questionable whether the modernization will be cost-effective and receive sufficient 
funding.  Similarly, the Achzarit APC, modified from the Russian T-54/T-55 MBT 
chassis, is being considered for modernization.  However, none of the current systems are 
suitable for a future force that will operate in a high-tech environment.   
To address the limitations of these models, foreign alternatives have been 
evaluated.  One of the proposals considered was the U.S. -patented Stryker combat 
vehicle.  Initially, the Stryker seemed to be the ultimate infantry vehicle for Israel’s 
purposes.  It was at the center of a U.S. Army development program that envisioned the 
Stryker as a replacement for the Abrams tank, Bradley APC, and Crusader artillery 
vehicle.  However, for a number of reasons, Israel’s evaluation of the Stryker did not 
produce favorable results: First, for Israelis, the U.S. requirements for aerial deployment 
and agility were not pertinent since the IDF operates within Israel and requires 
survivability.  Second, the performance of Stryker in Iraq was unsatisfactory, measured 
by the U.S. Army’s loss of 12 of them, and the subsequent redesign involved assembling 
additional armor that deteriorated Stryker’s performance.  Third, the Stryker was not 
designed for and was not particularly successful in the Israeli theater, which is quite 
mountainous and contains both urban terrain and desert.125  Therefore, the IDF General 
Staff decided to place this platform on hold. 
4. What was Learned from the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC)? 
The IDF developed the concept of “learn and fight-fight and learn” during the 
LIC of the last four years.  In this concept, training activities are integrated with the 
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performance of operational missions in the area of the operations.  Therefore, the IDF has 
shortened its basic training to two concentrated periods, of three and six weeks, followed 
by a mission oriented training period.126  The shortened training phase enables soldiers to 
continue their training in an environment related to their combat duty.  Junior leaders 
continue their training during the intervals between operations, and improve their war 
fighting skills by using mobile shooting simulators, as well as devices that simulate the 
conflict environment, with three-dimensional and dynamic targets.127
LIC has increased the importance of intelligence gathered by both by military and 
non-military sources.  The individual soldier, who can report things like public mood, 
religious activity, demonstrations, weapons stock movements, and ambushes, has been an 
important source of this information.  This brings up the issue of integration of the 
individual into the overall information system.  Non-military sources, like fire and 
medical rescue personnel, public works and transportation employees, bankers, and the 
media, often operate in the same area as the military, and they can collect better 
information in many cases, making them another valuable part of the intelligence 
gathering process.  According to IDF officials, until recently, there was no doctrinal 
template for the integration of such information into the overall intelligence picture.  The 
IDF worked on creating a “mutual language” with other operatives in the area to utilize 
their information capabilities.128  Mutual language makes it easier to distribute and utilize 
the information gathered by both military and non-military means.  This is a good 
implementation of the U.S. military transformation’s goal of ‘interoperability’ on the way 
to form a joint force that cooperates with non-military organizations. 
On the other hand, the very nature of LIC dictates that troops act on their own 
initiatives depending on the situation.  In most cases, units do not have time to get 
consent of higher command.  Even if there is no time constraint, in local incidents no 
headquarters can have better information than the unit commander on the ground.  This is 
because small units have better access to local information.  Therefore, the ultimate 
 
126 B.C. Kessner, ”IDF Changed Structure, Training, and Doctrine to Build Force For LIC” Defense 
Daily, Vol. 221, No. 56 March 26, 2004 
127 Amir Buhbut, 'IDF Purchases Advanced Mobile Shooting Simulators,' Maariv International, June 9, 2004. 
128 B.C. Kessner, “IDF Relying More on Troops, Technology For Intel Requirements,” Defense Daily 
International, Vol. 4 No. 15, April 23, 2004. 
92 
                                                
posture of a small unit for the IDF is the one that allows it to make its own battle 
assessment without dependence on the overall assessment of higher headquarters.  
Additionally, weekly debriefings enable the field commanders to learn from the 
experiences of troops.  Such information sharing aims at motivating units to adapt their 
own tactics and operations to changing situations by making use of local knowledge.  
Such units are self-synchronized since they utilize both local intelligence and overall 
information capabilities to increase situational awareness. 
5. Focused Logistics? 
Recently, the IDF's Technological and Logistics Directorate (TLD) proposed the 
establishment of a multi-branch logistics command.  The proposal recommended the 
integration of the logistical bodies of the three services.  This approach aimed to cut 
expenses and consolidate logistics efforts under the TLD.  With this new consolidated 
structure, the IDF will exhibit a joint approach to logistics.  The proposal also established 
territorial divisions.  Under this plan, the IDF’s logistics bases will be concentrated in the 
Northern and Central regional bases.129  This regional-territorial establishment is also an 
indicator of the IDF’s effort to adapt its forces to regional missions. 
Another logistical reform is the implementation of enterprise resource planning 
(ERP), which will cost an estimated NIS 100 million.  The ERP project will computerize 
all IDF systems related to inventories, personnel, procurements, storage, production, and 
budgets.  According to the ERP system director, the system will provide the IDF with an 
integrated perspective and advanced technological capability.  Furthermore, the system 
will enable the IDF logisticians to speak the same language used by the integrated 
computer systems.130
The computerized logistical system is in line with the “focused logistics” concept 
of U.S. Joint Vision 2020.  According to JV 2020, focused logistics “provides military 
capability by ensuring delivery of the right equipment, supplies, and personnel in the 
right quantities, to the right place, at the right time to support operational objectives”.  
Similar to the Israeli approach, U.S. focused logistics program will result from linkage of 
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logistical functions through information systems.131  On the other hand, currently, the 
U.S. military‘s joint forces do not operate logistical bodies under one command.  The 
services still have their own logistical bodies and the jointness notion of the U.S. military 
transformation has not yet fully materialized in this realm.  The IDF has developed this 
U.S. concept, and, thanks to its smaller organization and local missions, has achieved 
results beyond that of the U.S. military. 
D. WHAT REMAINS TO BE TACKLED BY USING THE AMERICAN 
APPROACH? 
The current transformation of the IDF target creating a future force that uses 
information age technologies and high-tech weaponry tailored to Israel’s current security 
environment and future combat missions.  The creation of such a force requires 
organizational restructuring, weapons procurement, investment in the information age 
technologies, and, maybe more importantly, having professional and dedicated 
manpower.  So far, Israel’s performance in the organizational and material realms seems 
satisfactory.  However, a number of issues must be addressed using the U.S. 
transformation concepts.  While the IDF operates under different conditions and to 
different missions, U.S. examples can at least provoke thought among IDF transformers.  
Chief among the issues constraining the IDF’s future development is its current 
manpower profile. 
1. A Professional Military? 
Throughout its history, the IDF has been a people’s army, and has achieved its 
most impressive successes with its citizen soldiers.  These citizen soldiers represent 
heroic examples of personal sacrifice.  However, today, as discussed in Chapter IV, this 
manpower profile is more of an impediment than a force multiplier.  The new citizenship 
discourses in Israeli society and their varying perceptions of military service undermine 
the IDF ethos that is built on the notion of a nation-in-arms.  Further, conscripts carry 
social tensions to the military and lack the professional skills necessary to operate 
modern systems.  The U.S. military transformation has a very clear emphasis on the 
employment of a professional volunteer military. 
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According to JV 2020, the future force will be composed of “individuals of 
exceptional dedication and ability.”  The U.S. approach assumes that personnel will 
perform in a variety of environment, on various missions, and will operate high-tech 
systems and platforms.  Such an environment calls for adaptability, innovation, precise 
judgment, forward thinking, and multicultural understanding.132  Furthermore, the notion 
of interoperability and widespread utilization of information technologies mandate skilled 
and well trained individuals.  The fact that Israeli society is becoming more techno-
literate and can develop individuals capable of performing in such a military does not 
help much.  No matter how skilled the average conscript is, a complete utilization of the 
individual is very much dependent on his full time service, over a number of years.  The 
professional force is also a condition for the development of jointness, since the 
development of jointness takes a long time and is a result of many exercises, training, and 
an institutional learning experience. 
The IDF’s reserve system is no longer productive.  Reserve duty, developed to 
support a system that triples IDF manpower in 48 to 72 hours after mobilization, aims to 
maintain the combat skills of soldiers after their mandatory service term.  However, 
reserve duty causes problems both in civilian and military spheres.  Until recently, one-
month call-ups, for men between the ages of 22 and 45, created an impact on the 
economy by workforce loss.  Additionally, the rescheduling of exams for university 
students, single-parent households, and job security for young people were also concerns 
for the reserves.  Once civilians began to serve in the reserves, they were assigned tasks 
different than their earlier training specialization.  Someone trained for regular warfare 
would find himself in a counterinsurgency operation.   
All of these factors have added to the unpopularity of reserve duty.133  For the 
IDF, let alone the conscientious objectors who reject military duty, operating with this 
unmotivated group is quite detrimental to morale. 
Reforms in the manpower policy of the IDF translate to a move toward a 
professional military.  The reorganization, or virtual abolition, of the reserve duty under 
 
132 JV 2020 Document, pp. 12-13. 
133 “The people's army comes of age,” Erik Schechter, Jerusalem Post, July 25, 2003. 
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Kela 2008 plan of July 2003 is indicative of such motion.  The IDF announced a number 
of remarkable changes in its reservist policy.  Kela 2008 brought several amendments: 
First, it limited reserve duty to 14 days a year and those who serve in the reserves in the 
future will be selected by the IDF among those who served in combat elements.  Second, 
it lowered reserve service age to 36.  Third, it declared that the IDF would not use 
reserves in operations in the West Bank or Gaza, nor in patrolling borders or guarding 
settlements.  Finally, it guaranteed that reserves would only be called up in wars or 
national emergency.134
One can suggest this policy be extended to regulars, who serve for mandatory two 
and three-year terms.  Despite the shortening of the mandatory service term in summer 
2004, the IDF was still an overwhelmingly conscript army.  This may cause several 
problems for the IDF.  First, as mentioned earlier, the IDF’s regulars will lack the 
necessary professional skills for operation of new combat systems or will at least be less 
functional.  Second, the social transformation and dominance of global trends within 
Israeli society will make ordinary conscripts less motivated toward service in the IDF, as 
opposed to personal association with his civilian goals.  Third, the national-religious 
Jews— haredim with their deferments and the yeshiva graduates with their segregated 
service— are likely to undermine the notions of universality and unity.  Furthermore, the 
prospects of insubordination, for which there are already enough indicators, are not 
acceptable for any military, let alone a transformed IDF that will operate in a joint 
fashion.  Therefore, the conscription issue must be addressed, by considering a transition 
to an all volunteer force, without neglecting indigenous Israeli conditions. 
While introducing many reforms in the IDF’s manpower policies, senior IDF 
commanders do not agree that these decisions are, in effect, moves toward a professional 
military.  Defense minister Saul Mofaz stated that the reforms were undertaken to 
“maintain the ethos of the reserve army, which is essential for Israeli society.” Similarly, 
the Ground Forces Commander General Yiftah Ron-Tal argues that the reserve army 
would continue to constitute the majority of the IDF since the regulars would never be 
 
134 “Israel Reviews Reserve Duties,” Alon Ben-David, Jane's Defence Weekly, April 07, 2004. 
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sufficient in the case of war.135  These statements reflect Israeli suspicion about the future 
of warfare.  The memory of previous high intensity conflicts advocates that quantity can 
overcome quality at high ratios.  As stated by critics in the IDF, this memory is a legacy 
of the Yom Kippur War and makes senior leaders focus on an existential threat and 
dependent on the tools of war required for such a war.  Moreover, the IDF, as the central 
public organization of Israel, does not want to lose its advantaged position, by letting the 
notion of the “people’s army” go away with the introduction of a professional but isolated 
force. 
2. Leaders and Education 
The officers in the IDF must prove their competences under real combat 
conditions and they are expected to socialize and develop their skills in the IDF’s active 
environment.  Currently the IDF does not have a military academy that educates officers 
in a manner fitting the notion of the IDF’s future force.  The traditional IDF system 
mandates selection and training based on the abilities of potential candidates.  The officer 
selection and training process starts in the basic training period and tests the candidate 
under vigorous conditions, only to select candidates with leadership qualities for higher 
ranks.  After undergoing basic training and the squad commander’s course, which trains 
privates and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO), the officer candidates complete a year 
long course resulting in the award of a commission as a second lieutenant in the IDF.  
The officers can then pursue further education in civilian universities or other vocational 
courses in the IDF.  Moreover, the system mandates continuous learning and training 
requirements for promotion to higher ranks.  Company commander candidates are 
required to complete the company commander course, and before promotion to colonel, 
officers must complete the command and staff course.  Additionally, the Tactical 
Command Course, which graduated its first company commanders in 2001, grants 
bachelor’s degrees after two years of education in military history.136
With institutions that educate officers in the IDF’s task oriented and practical 
manner, the current officer’s education and training system could benefit from the U.S. 
 
135 Alon Ben-David, Interview with Maj. General Yiftah Ron-Tal, Jane's Defence Weekly, March 24, 
2004.  
136 Arieh O'Sullivan, “New IDF Academy Graduates its First Class,” Jerusalem Post, July 19, 2001. 
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model, which depends on institutions aimed at educating officers for joint missions.  
First, the IDF should establish academies similar to the U.S. service academies, which 
educate officer candidates, for four years, according to the needs of the service.  In these 
academies, the IDF can focus on training that will enable future officer to manage the 
socio-technical systems of the information age.  Second, the U.S. education system 
emphasizes joint education and training at the postgraduate education level.  The Army, 
Navy, and Air War Colleges and other postgraduate schools educate the officer corps for 
future positions.  Bearing in mind that the new structure empowers the IAF and the IN, 
the IDF can model these joint institutions to improve cooperation between its arms. 
3. Civil Military Relations 
Civil-military relations are also an important issue for the IDF’s transformation.  
In the U.S. transformation model, civilians enjoy total control over the military.  The U.S. 
model tasks the combatant commanders with global joint operations.  The Joint 
Commanders are responsible to the President through the Secretary of Defense.  
Although Israel has similar regional commands, authority is in the hands of the COS of 
the IDF.  As discussed in Chapter IV, the historical development of the IDF, as the 
central institution of the State—almost on par with the state itself — makes the IDF enjoy 
a large degree of autonomy and this notion is an impediment to U.S.-styled civil military 
relations.  Furthermore, the IDF’s insistence on the notion of a “people’s army” in the 
case of reserves and conscription will enhance the IDF’s prominence at center stage in 
the future.  This is a direct result of the “security ethos” that strengthens the military at 
the expense of the civilians. 
The improvement of civil-military relations in Israel cannot be achieved by top-
down policies that target reform.  The organizational character of the IDF must also be 
transformed.  The implementation of policies that make the IDF more professional and 
compact can create a new character oriented toward mission rather than overall security 
of the nation.  Also, the institutionalization of the military academies and other 
educational organs will create a more professional officer corps that will see the military 
as professional employment rather than the school of nation with a duty of keeping the 
nation together.  This in turn would develop an understanding that civilians are  
98 
                                                
responsible for determining priorities regarding security issues while making the IDF 
more eager to develop force structure and operational concepts that is motivated by its 
professionalism. 
4. Operational Concepts and Search for new Platforms  
The IDF has already made organizational changes that will improve its combat 
efficiency.  The new brigade structure will include different units in its organic structure.  
In this organic structure, branches like infantry, artillery, armor, combat engineer, 
support, and service-support units will be constant parts of the brigade.  The IDF is also 
planning for more balanced mobile formations.  Since fewer numbers of tanks enables 
flexibility, future units of the IDF will be task-oriented.  The brigades will include 
organic tank, mechanized infantry, combat engineering, and artillery units.  The sub-units 
of these brigades, battalion battle groups, will carry their tactical supply of oil, petrol, 
lubricants, and ammunition.  Attack helicopters and UAV’s, in some cases will be 
attached to these units.  This new concept is reminiscent of the U.S. Army’s project 
Objective Force that aims to deploy self sufficient brigade sized units. 
According to the objective force (future force) concept, operational units of the 
U.S. Army will be the Unit of Action (UA) and the Unit of Establishment (UE).  The 
Objective Force will deploy a brigade sized UA in 96 hours, a division sized UE in 120 
hours, and five UE’s in 30 days in global theaters.137  While being based on the agility 
and rapid deployment capabilities of the units, this project envisions joint capabilities of 
the UA’s.  Like the IDF’s new organization, the division sized UE’s will serve as the 
headquarters, leaving combat to the UA commanders.  Despite Israel’s need for firepower 
and protection over deployment capabilities, and that the objective force is still not on 
ground, the IDF can study this concept as a trial of jointness in its ground elements.  
The Future Combat Systems (FCS) is another project of interest.  FCS aims to 
provide the Objective Force with a family of eight manned and ten unmanned air and 
ground systems.  These systems will be developed in harmony to achieve war fighting 
capabilities against conventional and unconventional adversaries.138  They include 
 
137 “How Transformational is the U.S. Military Transformation?” Torchbearer National Security 
Report, <http://www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/tbtransformation.pdf> (November 24, 2004), 9. 
138 Ibid., 12. 
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carriers, mounted combat systems, sensors, and command control elements.  While the 
IDF has tested and dropped the Stryker vehicles of the interim U.S. force that will 
precede the Objective Force, it could not come up with an original vehicle that will have 
mobility, fire power, and protection at the same time.  By the same token, the IDF’s 
investment in the integration of the individual with the system, in general, can benefit 
from the FCS approach that considers the individual as an integral part to be networked.  
Furthermore, the IDF has similar systems to the FCS, making the FCS a similar model to 
be observed in developing indigenous models in the achievement of jointness. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The IDF has taken successful steps in applying certain aspects of the U.S. military 
transformation.  In the technological realm of transformation, the difference between the 
IDF and U.S. implementations is one of scale, not of philosophy.  While the IDF needs 
networking capabilities for local and regional operations, U.S. information systems are 
designed for operations in overseas theatres.  In the doctrinal realm, the U.S. military 
transformation is not a remedy for the two essential threats facing the IDF: asymmetric 
war and WMD.  However, the IDF has utilized the notions of joint operations and 
information dominance for COIN operations.  The long reach capabilities—one can 
suggest it is a reminiscent of the defense in depth notion of the U.S. — model the 
utilization of airpower as a central element in war. 
Both the American and Israeli transformation projects are affected by similar 
circumstances.  First, the exploitation of superior intelligence capabilities is a common 
motivation for both projects.  Second, both projects are being criticized internally and by 
academia.  Third, both of the projects are being tested under real circumstances.  While 
the U.S. military cannot efficiently utilize its joint forces against the Iraqi insurgency, in 
the last Intifada, the IDF was able to stage a relatively more successful performance 
during the last Intifada. The IDF applied relevant U.S. concepts to the LIC and developed 
a networked force to fight the insurgency.  This is also because Israel is fighting a local 
war, has decades of experience fighting its adversary, and has a much more compact 
force, with no history of separate military services. 
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The current results prove that the IDF has already exploited a considerable 
amount of the U.S. experience.  According to IDF COS Lieutenant General Moshe 
Yaalon, the IDF has exploited these new concepts in the sub-conventional war.  Yaalon, 
states that the performance of the IDF in the Operation Days of Penitence in Gaza was a 
result of this jointness that integrated the ground forces with the IAF and the intelligence 
assets using C4I capabilities.  Yaalon furthers the concept with the integration of IN in 
some cases.139  While developing in a different scale and context, the IDF experience 
implies the fact that the application of the U.S. military transformation can result in 
successful models with different postures. 
 
139 Robin Hughes, “Lieutenant General Moshe Ya'alon - Israel Defense Force Chief Of Staff,” Jane's 
Defence Weekly, November 17, 2004 <http://www2.janes.com/K2/results.jsp> (November 19, 2004) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This thesis has studied the IDF’s transformation in the context of the U.S. military 
transformation.  In accomplishing this examination, the thesis has argued that the U.S. 
military transformation is the leading military transformation model with concepts and 
principles applicable to other militaries.  The thesis first explored the U.S. military 
transformation, and then analyzed the second research topic: the IDF.  In the IDF’s 
analysis the thesis first examined the threats in the Israeli security environment, second, 
current posture of the IDF was considered.  Following this, the thesis focused on the 
domestic and organizational conditions of the IDF, and from analysis of these areas, 
developed findings that mandate a transformation of the IDF.  Next, the thesis considered 
the applicability of the U.S. military transformation model to the IDF and concluded that 
the IDF was a good candidate for adapting some of the U.S. military transformation 
principles and concepts.  Having made this assertion, the IDF’s transformational projects 
were examined and similarities with the U.S. military transformation were pointed out.  
Finally, the thesis pointed out the areas that need further development by making use of 
American concepts. 
The following are the findings of this thesis regarding the U.S. and the IDF 
transformations: 
The U.S. military is an active military, almost overwhelmed with operations in the 
global theater.  The density of missions and the need to find solutions for the deficiencies, 
in the face of emerging threats in every new mission, force U.S. defense authorities to 
implement transformation to find remedies.  However, this transformation is a unique 
American experience.  U.S. operational goals, economic capabilities, and 
transformational imperatives are those of a hegemonic power.  Therefore, the U.S. 
military transformation project cannot be modeled by other militaries completely.  On the 
other hand, the U.S. military transformation is the state of the art in military affairs.   
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The U.S. military has the motivation, support, and research capabilities to carry 
out its transformational projects, which will enrich knowledge of warfare.  On these 
points, the U.S. military transformation should be closely examined by other militaries 
for the enhancement of their own transformational projects. 
On the other hand, the rising trend in warfare, asymmetric war, challenges the 
U.S. military and the current posture of its transformation.  Largely focused on 
conventional warfare, the U.S. military transformation utilizes the latest technology and 
weapon systems.  However, the conventional force structure and a remarkable part of the 
transformed capabilities are ineffective vis a vis the asymmetric threat.  As in the course 
of current operations in Iraq, highly sophisticated Air Force capabilities, like PGM’s and 
C4ISR capabilities, cannot defeat the insurgency.  This is because conventional 
capabilities—even the currently transformed conventional capabilities— are, simply, not 
well-suited for this type of warfare. 
The thesis also concluded that the IDF was a good candidate for adapting some of 
the U.S. transformation principles and concepts.  The high degree of techno-literacy 
among the Israeli society, developed information technologies infrastructure, and the 
IDF’s strategic concerns enable, and in some cases, have enabled, the adaptation of some 
of the U.S. transformation ideas to the IDF.  In fact, successful application of “original” 
U.S. ideas/technologies in the IDF’s COIN operations is important for the development 
of the U.S. military transformation. 
The Israeli security environment was considered, and it was noted that there is a 
decline in the realm of conventional military threats and uncertainty in the realm of 
WMD threats.  Currently, IDF’s conventional capability is at an all time high and its 
adversaries suffer from several factors that make them unable to counter the IDF in a 
conventional battle.  On the other hand, Israel faces the possibility of a future Iranian 
nuclear threat, as well as, CW and strategic missile threats from other adversaries in the 
Middle East.  These points suggest that the IDF’s current conventional capability should 
be improved to be flexible enough to deal with the both types of threats.  Therefore, the 
IDF should seek out related U.S. transformation concepts to enhance its operational 
capabilities. 
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Currently, the asymmetric threat is the predominant threat for Israel.  
Accordingly, the IDF’s transformation should develop capabilities related to COIN.  
Additionally, the thesis also argued that there is a connection between the three types of 
threats that the IDF encounters.  Therefore, the IDF should consider the U.S. 
transformation model in developing forces, effective against multiple threats.  And, an 
examination of the IDF’s transformation shows that, in fact, the IDF is developing 
capabilities specifically targeted against the asymmetric threat and has remarkable 
projects to afford transformation into a force capable in other realms of warfare. 
A number of domestic imperatives effect the transformation of the IDF.  First of 
all, contemporary Israeli society, itself, is undergoing a transformation.  This societal 
change in Israel has created a pluralistic society with various citizenship discourses.  The 
main groups are the Republican discourse, those who associate themselves with 
traditional Israeli values and consider the state and the IDF as the principle actors in 
Israeli society, the secular-liberals, who associate themselves with the dominant global 
socio-economic trend, and the nationalist-religious group, which is in essence a reaction 
in society to the other two social groups.  There are other smaller groups like the 
immigrants from the Former Soviet Union, Ethiopians, guest workers, and the 
Palestinians that all work to increase fragmentation in the society.  As a result of this 
social fragmentation, the IDF does not enjoy unanimous support of the Israeli society 
unlike the time of the Arab-Israeli Wars.  The social transformation challenges the 
nation-in-arms notion which has long been the central pillar of the IDF.  Therefore, the 
IDF’s transformation should consider the effects of new social conditions in Israel. 
This new social picture also impacts the military service.  First, the liberal Israelis 
increasingly see the military service a liability.  While not avoiding the IDF service, for 
this group, the years spent in the IDF service to secure the country’s future should in 
effect be spent to secure the individual’s future.  Second, the haredim avoid serving in the 
IDF for religious reasons.  These two groups harm the IDF’s universal conscription 
policy that aims to keep the IDF a people’s army.  On the other hand, the nationalist-
religious group serves in the IDF with enthusiasm.  The members of this group serve 
mainly in combat units and as elite unit members.  Moreover, the members of this group 
tend to develop military careers by occupying more professional, long term positions and 
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command posts.  The problem with voluntary participation has two dimensions: First the 
segregated nationalist-religious units are threatening the unity of the IDF.  Second, this 
group’s obedience to their orders is questionable in situations where the orders are 
perceived to violate religious rules.  All of these perceptions of the military service are 
challenges to the functioning of the IDF as well as imperatives for amendments in its 
manpower policies. 
Conscription is at the root of many problems, ranging from professional 
incompetence to poor civil-military relations.  The restlessness caused by differing 
reactions to military duty, and the potential problems of the segregated service can be 
resolved by an all volunteer force.  Moreover, the operation of high technology systems 
and weaponry in a joint force mandates professional cadres that devote a number of years 
to their careers.  However, all voluntary forces have their own costs.  The budgetary 
constraints are the biggest impediments for the transformation to a volunteer force.  
Additionally, employing quality manpower, maintaining their motivation, and evading 
the perils of isolation from Israeli society are major challenges for a voluntary force. 
The thesis also concluded that the civil-military relations in Israel have been 
shaped by the Israeli security ethos, which is in effect a product of the nation-in-arms 
notion.  The lack of clear boundaries between the civilian and military spheres 
materializes in the so called “parachuting syndrome”.  The retired generals “parachute” to 
politics and they often acquire high positions in the Israeli governments.  The result is the 
transfer of the IDF’s security ethos into the executive branches of the Israeli State.  
Moreover, the informal relations between the state elite and the IDF enable the military to 
affect political decisions.  In certain cases, this phenomenon surfaced as opposition to  
political decisions by the IDF.  The current state of civil-military relations in Israel is an 
impediment to the operation of the IDF as a professional military that is controlled by its 
political authorities. 
The thesis also argued that the current IDF transformation has benefited from the 
U.S. military transformation model.  The IDF’s transformational projects that seek to 
develop superior intelligence capabilities, integrate various information systems and 
C4ISR elements are similar to the American NCW models.  The foundation of the 
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regional commands, redefining of their AOR’s, and changes in the command chains 
resemble the U.S. military’s command structure.  Moreover, the efforts to create a 
common language in operations, logistics, and between different agencies, and insistence 
on combined arms are steps to achieve a joint force.  Finally, the new Israeli operational 
concepts envisage self-sufficient brigades as the main maneuver elements.  This notion 
contends a balanced structure of different branches and it is reminiscent of the U.S. 
Army’s future brigades. 
On the other hand, the Israeli transformation has developed indigenous 
capabilities in the LIC.  The territorial divisions that include battalion combat teams have 
local intelligence capabilities and further enhance their capabilities by networking with 
other IDF units and non-military organizations.  While the digitalization projects improve 
the situational awareness of the IDF forces, the units also enjoy autonomy in their AOR’s 
since they are better informed about the local situation.  Moreover, the weekly 
debriefings, the “learn and fight- fight and learn” concept, and improved COIN training 
systems and equipment are genuine IDF projects that can be called transformational. 
The thesis also contends that the IDF still lacks certain features that detract from 
in forming a more effective military.  On this point, the thesis argues that the IDF can 
enhance its current transformation by addressing issues, which can be ameliorated by 
utilizing the U.S. transformation model and military organization.  The following are the 
main areas of interest in developing an indigenous IDF model. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE IDF 
• The IDF should transfer to a voluntary force while developing approaches 
to mitigate the negative effects of the transition.  The IDF can employ 
completely professional personnel in the officer corps and the NCO corps 
as well squad and team leaders.  The positions that need technical 
expertise like operators of the C4ISR systems, weapons systems, 
platforms and vehicle operators can be given to professional contracted 
personnel.  These soldiers can be the pioneers of an all voluntary force that 
will replace the current force in phases.  Each phase of transition should 
have its own standards and assessment criteria that prevent the 
implementation of the next phase prior to fully executing the current one. 
• The military transformation is a process without any specific end-state.  
The IDF can only keep its transformation relevant by encouraging critical 
thinking and intellectual superiority among its members.  The IDF can 
institutionalize the transformational efforts by founding a body 
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specifically tasked with the development and assessment of the 
transformation.  More importantly such an institution should aim to 
encourage transformation innovated within the organization with the 
initiatives of the individuals. 
• The current education system of the IDF focuses on the selection of 
competent junior leaders during their mandatory services and the officers 
continue to pursue academic degrees on their own will or in vocational 
programs.  However, the transformed IDF will need leaders able to 
manage the complex technical and social systems of the future military 
operating in a joint fashion.  Therefore, the IDF needs to found a military 
academy.  Military academy should meet the needs of the different 
services and support the postgraduate institutions that consolidate 
jointness and interoperability. 
• IDF can further develop COIN forces that are networked to the overall 
information system, at the same time operating independently with local 
knowledge.  Since the LIC is currently the pressing issue for the IDF, 
these regional divisions should develop the small unit infrastructure to 
consolidate and almost institutionalize control in their AOR’s.  This would 
call for units specifically responsible for the COIN as opposed to the 
multi-mission forces of today. 
• The IDF should also have a conventional force with effective fire, 
maneuver, and long reach capabilities.  The self-sufficient joint forces 
should be smaller scale tactical units that would be self-synchronized by 
using joint capabilities.  The capabilities of IAF and IN should be 
integrated into this force.  This integration would call for the primacy of 
the IAF (or even IN) in some missions.   
• This calls for an overall joint command that will not be biased with the 
ground forces paradigm and a command which is not overwhelmed with 
COIN or Homeland Security missions. 
• These mission-oriented military structures will call for separate 
organizations.  However, the whole point of transformation is the ability to 
network these proposed forces, with different missions, and use them 
synergistically.  Therefore, the IDF’s future posture would be a 
composition of mission oriented forces that are not necessarily 
incompatible, but are linked with C4ISR, logistical, educational, doctrinal, 
and cultural bonds. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE US MILITARY TRANSFORMATION 
Currently the U.S. military transformation is specifically challenged by the Iraqi 
insurgency and by the rise of asymmetric warfare in military affairs at large.  Concepts 
like NCW, EBO, and forward presence have proved to be very effective vis à vis the 
conventional militaries, making the U.S. deterrence and compliance stronger than ever.  
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However, the U.S. transformation did not change much in the asymmetric realm.  Indeed, 
the U.S. adversaries now realize that there are still ways to counter U.S. power.  These 
developments are indicative of future trends in warfare.  This suggests that adversaries 
will avoid facing conventional force and will increasingly search for asymmetric 
encounters.  This very fact undermines current trends in U.S. military transformation. 
However, transformation is not just developing new capabilities.  It is in fact 
finding new way of defeating the adversary with the capabilities at hand and developing 
the relevant capabilities in the face of these emerging threats.  On this point, the thesis 
suggests a return to threats-based planning as opposed to capabilities-based planning.  
Therefore, concept development, experimentation, and research can be channeled in a 
way that is responsive to the new reality.  As the IDF proves in some cases, like LIC, 
there are many innovative ways of thinking that can make current information 
capabilities and sophisticated weaponry relevant to the threats.  Indeed, these capabilities 
will even make the current force more effective in COIN as they do in conventional 
conflicts.  After all, notions like jointness, interoperability, innovation, and critical 
thinking have applicability in every kind of conflict. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Studying the military transformation in the IDF and in the U.S. context 
contributed to the productivity of this work.  Since the Israeli security environment is rich 
with a variety of security threats, and IDF is charged with meeting this phenomenon 
almost on a daily basis, the IDF is a good case for discovering the results of the 
transformational efforts that are subject to global scrutiny.  Moreover, the IDF faces a 
number of imperatives that mandate transformation, thus making it a good laboratory for 
different dimensions of military affairs.  Apparently the IDF’s transformation is not a just 
a copy of the U.S. transformation, but has many parallels, indicating the effect of the 
pioneering U.S. concepts.  On this point, it is clear that studying the IDF transformation 
can be a baseline for other militaries that intend to utilize the U.S. military 
transformation. 
The final word is on the U.S. military transformation as a new way of fighting 
wars.  While there is much debate on the posture of the force that fights the future wars—
in COIN missions some claim paramilitary or non-military solutions— it is also salient 
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that the military is the professional organization that is formed for addressing security 
concerns.  As long as there is a conflict of any kind, and weapons are being used by the 
parties, the military is the only organization that can secure interests.  Therefore, the U.S. 
military transformation is a valuable attempt at finding new ways of fighting wars in 
changing environments.  This new way of war is much more efficient—and efficiency 
counts in warfare— than the attrition battles of the past and the prospect of nuclear 
warfare that offers little more than mutual destruction.  Therefore, if managed wisely, the 
attempt to find new ways of fighting wars will eventually contribute relevant capabilities 
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